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ABSTRACT 
Recent developments in the population engagement strategies associated with Operation 
Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan have 
led to the emergence of the Female Engagement Teams. These teams seek to provide 
insight and intelligence while engendering American and ISAF efforts in the region, by 
utilizing female service members to actively engage and interact with the population. 
This thesis endeavors to answer the question of how the Female Engagement Teams 
evolved around combat exclusion and whether, given the nature of the conflict in 
Afghanistan, they can serve to facilitate the missions of counterinsurgency and 
population engagement? This paper will serve as the beginning of the academic analysis 
of this concept and policy for potential use in future determinations by civilian and 
military leadership. Understanding of both the tribal networks wielded by women and 
their capacities to influence their world while still recognizing the given constraints and 
realities of gender seclusion are a necessity to truly exploit the human and cultural terrain 
in Afghanistan. The FETs despite the restrictions of combat exclusion seem the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. THE QUESTION 
Recent developments in the population engagement strategies associated with 
Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force in 
Afghanistan have led to the emergence of the Female Engagement Teams. These Teams 
seek to provide insight and intelligence while engendering American and International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) efforts in the region, by utilizing female marines and 
soldiers to actively engage and interact with the population. Cultural norms and religious 
dictates have traditionally prevented male troops from reaching the female portion and 
even certain segments of the male portion of the Afghan constituency. Such interactions 
are thought to serve the greater population engagement strategy as well as aid in 
intelligence gathering and counterinsurgency efforts. Due to the relatively recent 
evolution of this program little academic research has been done on the exact nature of 
this program and whether or not it has seen the level of success hoped, with regards to 
population engagement and counterinsurgency.  This thesis endeavors to answer the 
question of how the Female Engagement Teams evolved around combat exclusion and 
given the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan can they serve to facilitate the missions of 
counterinsurgency and population engagement? 
This paper will serve as the beginning of the academic analysis of this concept 
and policy for potential use in future determinations by civilian and military leadership 
on various issues. Certainly this concept plays a significant role in determining future 
policy implications for the United States (U.S.) and ISAF in Afghanistan. The ongoing 
conflict in Afghanistan has left many traditional military strategists at a loss. Recent 
prominence of various counterinsurgency strategies have emerged, entailing new and 
unique policies on population engagement. The Female Engagement Teams reflect just 
one of such policies. This program demonstrates a greater policy of population 
engagement and therefore indicates the successful utilization of these concepts for future 
military and diplomatic operations. Their success or failure at affecting U.S. and ISAF 
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images among the population as well as providing vital intelligence and contacts to 
counterinsurgency efforts will greatly determine whether these paths continue to be 
followed or if military efforts are turned.  
Furthermore, any success of these types of programs has implications on the 
American combat exclusion laws and future uses of women in the military. The recent 
addition of women to submarines in the U.S. Navy (USN) and the additions of more 
available assignments in the fields of intelligence and logistics, in addition to disputes 
over hostile fire taken by these Female Engagement Teams, has once again brought this 
debate to the forefront of domestic politics for both civilian and military leadership. 
Future scholarship on the subject will continue to grow as the policy becomes more 
entrenched and further after-action analyses and studies are released.  
The use of the Female Engagement Teams in the Afghan conflict carries with it a 
host of difficult issues. The very nature of these teams comes in direct contrast to the 
American combat exclusion laws as well as seeming to contradict traditional U.S. foreign 
policy and tactics on counterinsurgency and population engagement requirements. The 
evolution of these teams demonstrates that they and the greater population engagement 
strategy reflect an evolving understanding of the nature of modern warfare and 
diplomacy. American political and military acknowledgement of regional norms 
regarding gender and religion are enabling outreach to a greater percentage of the 
indigenous populations. The use of Female Engagement Teams to reach the female 
populace of Afghanistan is just one such instance though debate over their validity and 
success remains. 
Much deliberation has been done over the very legality of such a program. Legal 
justifications have been utilized and commander’s guidance on definitions has been 
necessary in order to ensure compliance with the combat exclusion law. Yet debate 
remains over whether these teams fly in the face of the law’s intent.  
The very concept of population engagement is in and of itself a highly contested 
issue. Whether these tactics and strategies truly aid in military operations and 
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counterinsurgency is debated among scholars and operators alike.1 Recently the concept 
has begun to gain significant traction and policies such as the Female Engagement Teams 
are reflecting a growing consensus that population engagement and counterinsurgent 
intelligence gathering are essential for modern warfare and diplomacy.2 Female 
Engagement Teams reflect a growing understanding on behalf of civilian and military 
leadership of the imperatives for population engagement and the necessities of cultural 
norms and religious dictates particularly those regarding the interactions of women. 
Expectations for research are that this program has been successful both in providing 
vital intelligence and contacts for counterinsurgency as well as in its primary mission of 
building a more positive U.S. and joint image and developing lasting relationships among 
the entire indigenous populace by showing American and ISAF respect for regional 
norms on gender and religion. Ironically, such considerations of gender relations have 
continued to highlight such issues within the U.S. military itself.   
Female Engagement Teams are a relatively recent phenomenon and as such little 
direct academic research has been conducted on them, their evolution, and their results. 
Much of the prevailing knowledge on the subject comes from non-analytical reports or, 
                                               
1 See Kevin Carson. “Just in Case You Weren’t Sure: Counterinsurgency Isn’t ‘Progressive’”; John R. 
Dyke. “Unconventional Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan;”  David Kilcullen. The Accidental Guerilla; 
David Kilcullen. Counterinsurgency; David Kilcullen. “In Company with Insurgency;” David Kilcullen. 
“Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency;”  James Forest. Countering 
Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century; Harald Havoll. COIN Revisited: Lessons of the Classical 
Literature on Counterinsurgency and its Applicability to the Afghan Hybrid Insurgency; Thomas H. 
Henriksen. Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency, And the Indirect Approach; Seth G. Jones. Counterinsurgency 
in Afghanistan; Laura Loftus, Colonel. “Influencing the Forgotten Half of the Population in 
Counterinsurgency Operations;” Austin Long. Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The U.S. Military and 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960–1970 and 2003–2006; Austin Long. On “Other War”: Lessons from 
Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research; John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy. 
Rethinking Counterinsurgency. RAND Counterinsurgency Study; Zahid Nawaz Mann. “The Nature of 
Insurgency in Afghanistan and the Regional Power Politics;” Sasha Mehra. “Equal Opportunity 
Counterinsurgency: The Importance of Afghan Women in U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations; Samuel 
Musa, John Morgan, and Matt Keegan. Policing and COIN Operations: Lessons Learned, Strategies, and 
Future Directions; Christopher Paul. Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2011 Relative to 
the Insurgencies of the Past 30 Years; Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill. Victory has a 
Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies; Jeremy L Pfeifer. “Training and Organization 
for COIN Conflicts: A Historic Perspective with Contemporary Applications;” Thomas Ricks. “Women in 
COIN (II): How to do it Right;” Nicholas J. Schlosser and James M. Caiella, eds. Counterinsurgency 
Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond; Jonathan Stevenson. Counter-Terrorism: Containment and 
Beyond; U.S. Army. Field Manual (FM) 3–24: Counterinsurgency; U.S Army. Tactics in 
Counterinsurgency. Field Manual. 3–24.2. 
2  Ibid. 
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on occasion, after action analysis. Oftentimes the most current research exists only in the 
classified realm. Still, the use of women in military operations is itself not uncommon 
throughout history and the evolution and integration of Female Engagement Teams 
appears to be premised upon prevailing knowledge and understanding.3 Moreover, many 
of the concepts that comprise and contribute to this phenomenon have themselves seen 
significant advances in the depth of knowledge over time, particularly in recent years. 
These concepts include women in combat, counterinsurgency, and particularly for the 
purposes of this paper, population engagement.  
Female combatants and their debates in American rhetoric are certainly not a 
recent trend.4 Yet for most this has been primarily in supporting roles and only on rare 
occasion in the line of fire. During the twentieth century, the nature of American warfare 
                                               
3  Kristal L.M. Alfonso, Lieutenant Colonel USAF. “Femme Fatal: An Examination of the Role of 
Women in Combat and the Policy Implications for Future American Military Operations;”; Andi Allen, 
Gina Ladenheim, and Katie Stout. “Training Female Engagement Teams: Framework, Content 
Development, and Lessons Learned;” Paula Broadwell. “Women at War;”  Elisabeth Bumiller. “Creating 
Bonds and Breaking Barriers: Female U.S. Marines Try to Redefine Military Role by Aiding Afghan 
Women;” Elisabeth Bumiller. “Dodging U.S. Limits on Women in Combat; Many Female Marines in 
Afghanistan have had no Option but Firing Back;” Elisabeth Bumiller. “Letting Women Reach Women in 
Afghan War;” Karen O. Dunivin, Lieutenant Colonel USAF. “Military Culture: A Paradigm Shift?” 
Kristen W. Culler. “The Decision to Allow Military Women into Combat Positions: A Study in Policy and 
Politics;” Krystyna Cloutier. “Marching Toward War: Reconnoitering the use of all Female Platoons;” Fox 
News. “Female Marines Wear Headscarves Over Body Armor in Afghanistan;” Darlene M. Iskra, CDR, 
USN (ret), PhD. Women in the United States Armed Forces: A Guide to the Issues; Military Leadership 
Diversity Commission. Women in Combat: Legislation and Policy, Perceptions, And the Current 
Operational Environment;   Brian Mitchell. Women in the Military: Flirting with Disaster; Karen Parrish. 
“DoD Opens More Jobs, Assignments to Military Women;” Matt Pottinger, 1stLt and Johannah Shaffer 
2ndLt. “Afghanistan Female Engagement Team After-Action and Way Forward; Michele M. Putko and 
Douglas V. Johnson II, eds. Women in Combat Compendium;  Rosemarie Skaine. Women at War: Gender 
Issues of Americans in Combat;, Sara L. Ziegler and Gregory G. Gunderson. Moving Beyond G.I. Jane: 
Women and the U.S. Military.  
4 See Michele M. Putko and Douglas V. Johnson II, eds. Women in Combat Compendium: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2008; Karen O. Dunivin, Lieutenant Colonel USAF. “Military Culture: A Paradigm 
Shift?” The Maxwell Papers 10, (February, 1997); Kristal L.M. Alfonso, Lieutenant Colonel USAF. 
“Femme Fatal: An Examination of the Role of Women in Combat and the Policy Implications for Future 
American Military Operations.” Air University: Air Force Research Institute, 2009; Farangis Najibullah. 
Afghan Women Joining Armed Forces in Greater Numbers, Challenging Convention. Anonymous 2010; 
Paula Broadwell. “Women at War.” The International Herald Tribune, October 21, 2009, sec. Edie; 
Krystyna Cloutier. “Marching Toward War: Reconnoitering the use of all Female Platoons.” Connecticut 
Law Review (2008); David Galula. Pacification in Algeria: 1956–1958 RAND Corporation, 2006; Susan 
Pinker. “Team Work, Gender and the Power of Bonding.” The Globe and Mail (Canada), May 23, 2011, 
sec. Report on Business: Managing; Business Brain; Elisabeth Bumiller. “Dodging U.S. Limits on Women 
in Combat; Many Female Marines in Afghanistan have had no Option but Firing Back.” The International 
Herald Tribune, October 4, 2010, sec. News; The Secretary of Defense. “Direct Ground Combat Definition 
and Assignment Rule.” 
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and the inclusion of women in the services began to evolve albeit women remain 
restricted from hostile action and combat positions. This prohibition on women in combat 
was generally referred to as Combat Exclusion.5 The Global War on Terror would force 
both military and civilian leadership to reconsider this highly contested and emotionally 
charged issue. The nature of the conflict in the region dictated that nearly every military 
operator was deemed at risk. Since Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield, 
unconventional warfare with blurry frontlines has grown and social changes have begun 
to generate greater paradigm shifts in the combat exclusion policies and military culture.6 
Subsequently, more and more women are finding themselves in combat support positions 
and even at times in direct combat themselves.7 In 2010, the Department of the Navy 
opened officer positions onboard U.S. submarines for women. In 2012 the services would 
petition Congress to open even more previously restricted intelligence and combat 
support positions to women. Furthermore, a call was sent out for interested women in the 
ground forces wishing to join the newly formed Female Engagement Teams. Yet the 
debates continue to resonate over American acceptance of women in combat, the best 
interests of the U.S. forces, and the integral rights of female service members. 
As with female combatants, the concept of counterinsurgency has been rife with 
debate. Counterinsurgencies have been fought throughout history by various means and 
the accepted means to wage them have continued to evolve and change from Algerian 
resistance to French colonialism to the various insurgent groups of Afghanistan. A 
commonly acknowledged understanding of insurgencies is that they are targeted political 
violence against the authority of the state or occupation aimed at greater political goals.8  
Insurgencies rely on popular support and often lack the funding and resources of their 
enemies, typically conventional forces.  
                                               
5 Michele M. Putko and Douglas V. Johnson II, eds. Women in Combat Compendium: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2008, 22. 
6 Karen O. Dunivin, Lieutenant Colonel USAF. “Military Culture: A Paradigm Shift?” The Maxwell 
Papers 10, (February, 1997), 23. 
7 Today more than 80 percent of military positions are open to women. Ibid, 4. 
8 Heather S. Gregg, Dr. “Employment Handbook for Fighting Counterinsurgencies: A Toolkit for how 
to Build Rapport, Create Jobs, and Work Towards a Viable State.” Technical Report, From 2003 to 2008, 
Naval Postgraduate School for Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), 2009, 
14. 
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Counterinsurgency therefore reflects the political, economic, social, and military 
actions taken by the state or occupier in order to combat this violence. Modern 
philosophies on counterinsurgency focus on networks and relationships. Yet there are 
varying methods prescribed by which to attain the goals ascribed in counterinsurgency.9 
Current military doctrine maintains that in order to prevail at counterinsurgencies one 
must win the support of the people.10 This is reflected in the common adage of winning 
the hearts and minds. This focus on networks and relationships has reiterated the need for 
continued population engagement. Increasingly research has come to recognize the 
imperative to tap the gender-centric networks of women in order to capitalize on potential 
counterinsurgency capacities of this half of the population.11 A growing consensus has 
emerged recognizing the potential for women to contribute to counterinsurgency efforts 
in all its facets; intelligence gathering, security, governance, and development.  
This recognition of the potential contributions of women is also highly reflective 
of the growing resonance of the concept of population engagement as an imperative of 
both information dissemination and stability operations.12 Population engagement as a 
means for stability operations, foreign relations, and information operations recognizes 
the essential part popular support plays in maintaining stability in governance and 
security. Women have traditionally played less of a recognized role in this theory due to 
their relatively less obvious influential roles in rural and tribal societies such as 
Afghanistan. Nonetheless, growing consensus has emerged dictating that women play a 
far more crucial and vital role in determining support for engagement strategies than 
previously thought. Subsequently, effective engagement strategies must include a focus 
                                               
9 See Gregg; U.S. Army. Field Manual (FM) 3–24; Mehra; Carson; Forest; Kilcullen.  
10 Sasha Mehra. “Equal Opportunity Counterinsurgency: The Importance of Afghan Women in U.S. 
Counterinsurgency Operations.” Master’s, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2010, 1. 
11 See Ricks; Loftus; Andy Macak, Captain. “Female Engagement Teams in Counterinsurgency: 
Building A More Progressive Counterinsurgency Strategy.”  
12 See Adam Pain and Paula Kantor. “Understanding and Addressing Context in Rural Afghanistan: 
How Villages Differ and Why;” Thomas Barfield. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History.  
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on indigenous women.13 Such strategies must include a recognition and respect for 
regional and local norms regarding gender and religion in order to be effective. 
The conflict in Afghanistan has brought all of the facets of traditional Afghan 
society and culture, into the limelight. Imperatives for counterinsurgency and population 
engagement have forced military operators to coordinate with Afghan females, however 
cultural norms religious constraints mandate that for true effectiveness female military 
operators must be the ones to reach out rather than their male counterparts. Certainly this 
need comes up against the currently still restrictive American combat exclusion policies. 
Out of this debate has emerged the Female Engagement Teams. Resolutions such as this 
are still highly contested by both civilian and military leadership as to their necessity and 
effectiveness. In October of 2010, the first of the Female Engagement Teams returned 
from Afghanistan. Continued after-action analysis and academic research will help to 
shed light on this sensitive issue. 
B.  METHODOLOGY 
For the purposes of understanding the Female Engagement Teams, their 
contributions and implications, a qualitatively analytical case study focusing on the teams 
and their relationships to combat exclusion, counterinsurgency, and population 
engagement will follow. It is important to establish descriptive inference on how this 
practice evolved, its very nature, and whether or not it reflects the dictates of the 
aforementioned military strategies, as well as ascertain future policy implications. 
Hereafter, Chapter II will introduce the evolution, mission, and issues associated with the 
teams. In Chapter III, the evolution, arguments and governing directives for combat 
exclusion are outlined and annotated as to their relation to the realities on the ground in 
Afghanistan. Henceforth, Chapter IV will analyze the teams’ relations to 
counterinsurgency operations. Furthermore Chapter V will address their participation and 
                                               
13 See Matt Pottinger, Hali Jilani, and Claire Russo. “Half-Hearted: Trying to Win Afghanistan 
without Afghan Women;”  When Half the Country is Off Limits. PBS. Directed by Caitlin Thompson; 
Gary W. O’brien, Clerk of the Senate. “Training in Afghanistan: Include Women;” Valerie Norville. “The 
Role of Women in Global Security;” Lila Abu-Lughod. “Do Muslim Women really Need Saving? 
Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and its Others;” Headquarters International Security 
Assistance Force. Engaging the Female Populace; Carol J. Riphenburg. “Post-Taliban Afghanistan: 
Changed Outlook for Women?”; Condoleeza Rice. Independent Women’s Forum 2006.  
 8 
potential contributions to population engagement strategies. Included within each 
analysis pertaining to the Female Engagement Teams and their successes and failures are 
responses derived from after action reports and a survey of associated members and 
leadership personnel. Since little qualitative or quantitative data as yet exists, such 
firsthand accounts and responses provide the greatest insights into the actualities of the 
teams and their relations to combat exclusion, counterinsurgency, and population 
engagement. Finally, Chapter VI will present final analysis, potential opportunities for 
garnering further research and study and potential implications for policy.  
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II. NAVIGATING THE HUMAN AND CULTURAL TERRAIN 
A. REACHING OUT  
The human terrain represents one of the most vital assets and gravest challenges 
in conducting military operations in Afghanistan. As an asset it offers operators and 
strategists the opportunity to both extract and disseminate information pertinent to kinetic 
operations. However, this asset requires vigilance and understanding in order to be 
properly utilized. Thus “without careful study of the human terrain in Afghanistan, and a 
corresponding shift in tactics, international forces risk”14 missing out on an immense 
resource.  In response to the growing awareness of the fundamental importance of this 
sphere of influence, American and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces 
have begun to develop units aimed at counterinsurgency, human intelligence (HUMINT) 
gathering and population engagement. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are 
among the most prevalent and successful of such evolutions. These teams combine 
kinetic and non-kinetic applications and aims. PRTs were devised in Afghanistan in 2002 
as a means to facilitate interaction between friendly forces and local populations.15  They 
have since expanded to include other ISAF nations. Currently, there are 27 such teams 
operating in Afghanistan.16   
B.  WHAT ABOUT THE WOMEN? 
Despite much initial success, the PRTs and other human terrain teams found it 
difficult to fully engage the local populations. The constraints on these units and other 
such solely male comprised teams were found to be predominantly an issue of gender. 
Cultural and religious sensitivities in both Iraq and Afghanistan made operating 
exclusively with male service members less than optimally effective. Male operatives 
                                               
14 Thomas H. Johnson. “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan.” 
China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 5, no. 2 (2001), 24. 
15 Center for Army Lessons Learned. PRT Playbook: Tactics Techniques, and Procedures. CALL 
Handbook. No. 07–34 ed. http://call.army.mil: 2007, 2. 
16 Topics: International Security Assistance Force. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).” NATO 
OTAN, accessed Jan 28, 2012, http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/prt/, 1. 
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could neither interact with nor engage the female component of the population and at 
times found less than desired success in dealing with the Iraqi and Afghan men. In light 
of these obstacles, leadership sought opportunities to engage the female population with 
the utilization of female service members.  
1.  Lioness 
In 2003, with the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, American operatives found 
that interactions with Iraqi women were difficult given the cultural and religious 
segregation of the genders. In response, an ad hoc division of Army and Marine women 
from varying occupational specialties began to operate with their male counterparts 
beyond the traditional scope of American females deployed in country. This unit of 
women would later become identified by the moniker of the Lioness program. They 
would serve predominantly as facilitators to search and seizure operations and security 
checkpoints. Even so, given the nature of the war and the blurriness of defining a front 
line, these women began to consistently experience hostile fire and combat. Yet the 
benefits of the operations they conducted were paramount and leaders sought to bring 
these fruitful endeavors to the war in Afghanistan where cultural and religious norms and 
customs are even more staunchly conservative.  
2.  CSTs, FETs, FSTs, and FHETs 
Cultural Support Teams (CSTs), Female Engagement Teams (FETs), Female 
Search Teams (FSTs) and Female HUMINT Exploitation Teams (FHETs) are the 
evolution of the Lioness concept in reflection of the female component of the Afghan 
population. CSTs serve to enable special operations forces engagement of a host nation’s 
female and adolescent populace. FETs seek to build population confidence in the 
American and ISAF operation in Afghanistan through persistent engagement and positive 
reinforcement. FSTs are a military response to an immediate security mission 
requirement that demonstrates cultural sensitivity. They conduct search and seizure 
operations on women and women’s spaces. Lastly, FHETs are specifically geared at 
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intelligence collection and information operations as well as atmospheric analysis.17 All 
of these units serve the overarching mission of providing support to combat units for 
Afghan female engagement and interaction in order to support ground operations, access 
the Afghan population, gauge atmospherics, and gather human intelligence.18 This form 
of population engagement is by no means an attempt “to alter the Afghan culture. Rather, 
it is an operational response to respond to the current conservative response to the Afghan 
segregation of males and females.”19 The emphasis for the female human terrain is 
engagement and information gathering, not cultural transformation.  
These units are comprised of service women of varying operational specialties 
from each of the American and ISAF services, although predominantly Marines and 
Soldiers. While these units are by no means identical in mission, training, composition, or 
capacity; their overall existence is reflective of similar requirements and challenges 
facing ISAF forces in Afghanistan and associated issues with American forces in the U.S. 
military services. Due to their recent evolution and ongoing experimentation, after-action 
reports and statistical information on all of these units is miniscule if in existence at all. 
Subsequently, for the purposes of the following analyses hereafter they will fall under the 
all-encompassing term of female engagement teams.   
a.  Evolution 
In early 2009, Combat Logistics Battalion 3 (CLB-3) responded to a 
request from Third Battalion, Eighth Marines Regiment (3/8) for an ad hoc unit of female 
service members in order to comply with a specific cordon-and-knock operation in Farah 
province.20 The female service members served to meet with the village women and 
facilitate search and seizure operations. Subsequently, the first Female Engagement Team 
                                               
17 HQ ISAF/CJ2. Engaging the Female Populace, Public Law, HTS TCE/10, 10. 
18 Special Operations Task Force 81. Female Engagement Team (FET ), 5. 
19 HQISAF, 49. 
20 Captain Andy Macak. “Female Engagement Teams in Counterinsurgency: Building A More 
Progressive Counterinsurgency Strategy.” Research Paper, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010, 11. 
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was born.21  Originally the concept was envisioned as an Afghan complement to the 
Lioness program with a more prominent participation in information operations and 
population engagement. By the end of 2009, the teams were such a success that all ISAF 
forces were ordered to generate similar units.22  
b.  After Action and Applications 
While there exists little literature and no quantitative research has been 
conducted regarding the gains or losses of such units, they have qualitatively 
demonstrated two primary gains. After action reports from the units have found upon 
review that they provide significant benefits in the areas of intelligence gathering and 
information dissemination.23 These particular benefits represent significant opportunities 
for gains and their endeavors serve two particularly pertinent missions in Afghanistan; 
counterinsurgency (COIN) and population engagement. The FETs have served in a 
variety of capacities in support of these missions including intelligence collection, search, 
seizures and cordon-and-knock operations, key leader engagements, civil affairs 
programs, enhancing information operations and dissemination for psychological 
operations (PSYOPS). The FETs endeavor to increase access and influence upon the 
Afghan population, particularly the female component, enhance female contributions to 
Afghan society, and reduce negative influences and access from insurgent movements by 
creating meaningful relationships within the community.24  
c.  The Mission 
Surveyed members of the FETs each gave quite varied interpretations of 
the exact FET mission. Some felt it pertained primarily to supporting the battle space 
commander in whatever capacity deemed appropriate and necessary for overall mission 
                                               
21 Andi Allen, Gina Ladenheim, and Katie Stout. “Training Female Engagement Teams: Framework, 
Content Development, and Lessons Learned.” Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education 
Conference (I/ITSEC) (2010), 1. 
22 Mehra, “Equal Opportunity Counterinsurgency,” 25. 
23 Macak, “Female Engagement Teams,” 11. 
24 SOTF 81, 7. 
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completion. Others felt it served to facilitate interactions between ISAF forces and the 
Afghan female populace. Still others attributed it to integration with and support of male 
infantry battalions conducting counterinsurgency operations. Yet all seemed to feel that 
this mission was executed by engaging the local population (both male and female) 
through a variety of support elements and operations. All of the surveyed contributors felt 
that the FETs served a vital mission in Afghanistan and were met with overall positive 
responses; both Afghan and ISAF. They felt that the contributions to tactical intelligence, 
atmospherics, census data, rapport with community leaders, outreach and training 
demonstrated a commitment to the locals and a vital capability to both ISAF ground units 
and mission commanders. 
d. The Problems 
Unfortunately such an unprecedented and untested concept has its 
drawbacks. These units are predominantly ad hoc in nature, drawing upon women from 
various specialties that do not necessarily pertain to population engagement or 
intelligence collection. Due to the relative newness of the concept, they are often more 
experimental than experiential, based upon flexibility and commander interpretations of 
mission and doctrine rather than lessons learned and established protocol. 
In their early evolutions, they lacked proper training in both cultural 
awareness and forward combat operations. Their training requirements, techniques, and 
procedures are still in development and are constantly in flux as units return with more 
knowledge and experience. In the early stages, FET members continued to serve in their 
original designated positions in addition to their FET contributions. As such this limited 
their ability to focus on training and readiness regarding their specific FET operations.25 
This early lack of training extended to the upper leadership as well. The FET mission is 
often misunderstood, underestimated, and underutilized by military leadership. Certain 
commands and regions have subsequently found it difficult to reap the full rewards of 
having such units. 
                                               
25 Mehra, “Equal Opportunity Counterinsurgency,” 38. 
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The pool of potential female operators is limited given the strict 
requirements to be in such a hostile area. Unfortunately, this is severely limiting since 
until now female service members have not been pressed to comply with such standards 
in the field and lack adequate leadership, training, and experience with regards to combat 
operations. Perhaps the most pervasive hindrance to the FETs that highlights this 
inadequacy is that of combat exclusion. Efforts and considerations regarding the usage of 
women in potentially hostile combat situations is a hotbed of debate and has required 
extreme measures to ensure compliance or at the very least circumvention of given 
exclusion directives. This has at times come at the detriment of the FET mission forcing 
interactions between members and the populations to be relegated to the short-term and 
transitory, thereby inhibiting their ability to effectively develop meaningful relationships 
in order to maximize deliverable benefits.  
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III. FROM COMBAT EXCLUSION TO AFGHANISTAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The utilization of female American and International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) service members in Afghanistan as a component of forward operating counter-
insurgency and population engagement units, also known as Female Engagement Teams 
(as well as female service members operating under the Lioness program in Iraq), once 
again brought to light the highly contestable issue of combat exclusion in the American 
armed forces. The Female Engagement Teams have highlighted the murky waters that 
define the restrictions and guide the operational employment of American female military 
personnel. Debates would emerge over whether these teams were in violation of current 
policies, protocol and legislation. Once again the American military and civilian 
leadership would be forced to address the very concept of combat and the female 
participation therein. 
B. HISTORY OF WOMEN IN COMBAT 
1. Women in World Historical Combat 
The existence of women in combat and armed conflict is by no means a recent 
occurrence. Throughout history, women have been involved to some degree or another in 
nearly every violent conflict worldwide both as aggressors and as victims. Whether 
serving as camp followers26 in the traditional positions of victualers, cooks, laundresses, 
nursemaids, prostitutes, or serving as actual combatants themselves, women have been 
active participants.  
 When one thinks of a female combatant, oft images are conjured of masculine 
Amazons existing in a mythical time and place. Yet there have been women in combat all 
over the world throughout history. While their numbers may not be abundant, their 
stories tend to resound the world over. Documented cases of women serving in actual 
                                               
26 Camp followers were a vital part of armies’ support systems, freeing men to fight while women took care of 
the many logistical requirements of large military units. 
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combat are scarce, yet the stories of a few are widespread and renown. One of the first 
and foremost is that of Matilda of Tuscany, known as the sharp strategic commander of 
her armed forces during numerous engagements throughout the Investiture Controversy 
of 1080. Certainly, the historical female combatant, whom most would recognize, is that 
of Jeanne d’Arc or Joan of Arc, The Maid of Orleans, who led numerous campaigns from 
the battlefront as a combatant for the French during the Hundred Years War. Images 
abound of her astride a horse, bearing a knights armor and wielding a sword and 
standard. She is often seen as the epitome of femininity yet strength. In the modern age, 
documented female combatants became evermore prominent and openly utilized by 
nation-state governments. For instance Florence Nightingale received the British Order of 
Merit for her combat experiences during the Crimean War from 1854 to 1856. During 
World War II, the Russian army utilized female bomber pilots including Nadya Popova 
in its campaigns.  
Although, they later rescinded their policies regarding women in combat, the 
Israeli armed forces utilized an all-female combat unit, Palmach, during their war for 
independence. To date, Israeli women are still required to participate in mandatory 
uniform service although they are no longer eligible for combat oriented positions. 
2. History of Women in American Combat 
American women have also seen a consistent participation in armed conflict since 
the nation’s inception, whether overtly or covertly. During the revolutionary war women 
were often pressed into service out of necessity. From the tales of Molly Pitcher, who 
cast aside her water pitcher to man a mortar position, to Margaret Corbin, Deborah 
Samson, and Mary Ludwig Hays McCauley who were each granted pensions from 
Congress or continental legislatures for war services rendered whether openly serving as 
women or disguised as men. Elizabeth Newcume served under the guise of a male during 
the Mexican War and was later recognized by Congress for her service. During the civil 
war, women were seen to have served on both sides. Rose O’Neal Greenhow was found 
to be a Confederate informant, and Sarah Emma Edmunds also known as Franklin 
Thompson served as a Union Army volunteer. Furthermore, the first woman to receive 
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the Medal of Honor was contract surgeon Dr. Mary E. Walker during the Civil War. 
Annie G. Fox was the first to be awarded the Purple Heart, for her services while serving 
at Hickam Field during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  
Aside from these and other anomalies, American women had, prior to World War 
II, served predominantly in medical, administrative or support capacities. In 1901 the 
USA established the Army Nurse Corps and in 1908 the USN followed suit with the 
Navy Nurse Corps. However, “despite their integration and successes in limited 
capacities, women were never officially militarized until the 20th century.”27 Particularly, 
since WWII the militarization of women and the ever-evolving status of American 
women in combat has been a hotbed of debate and legislation with constant analysis and 
revision.  
 1942 - Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) and Women Accepted 
for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES)28 
 1943 - Women’s Army Corps (WAC) and Women’s Air Force Service 
Pilots  (WASP)29 
 1948 - Women’s Armed Services Integration Act30 
 -  Selected Service Act of 194831 
 1951 - Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services  
 (DACOWITS)32 
 1956 - Combat Exclusion Law codified under Title 10, U.S. Code 
 
 
                                               
27 Kristen W. Culler. “The Decision to Allow Military Women into Combat Positions: A Study in 
Policy and Politics.” Masters, Naval Postgraduate School, 2000, 12. 
28 Women are granted formal military recognition and are trained as clerks, mechanics, administrators, 
and cooks.  
29 Women are fully accepted into the Army Air Force (aside from combat and flight training). Women 
serve as civil service pilots via the WASP. 
30 Served to ensure the ready mobilization of women in the event of a national emergency or shortage 
of volunteers. Combat exclusion legislation is a component. Limits enlisted women to two percent of 
strength and officers to ten percent of enlisted strength and pay grade to O-5. 
31 PL 759–80th Congress Chapter 625–2D Session Statute 2655 states that it is the mandate of the 
United States Congress to provide for the common defense by increasing the strength of the armed forces 
of the United States, including the reserve components thereof, and for other purposes. 
32 Remains in existence as an advisory committee to the Secretary of Defense on all matters regarding 
female military service personnel.  
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  1964 - Title VII of the Civil Rights Act33 
  1967 - Public Law 90-13034 
  1972 - Equal Rights Amendment 
  1973 - All Volunteer Force35 
            - Frontiero v. Richardson36 
  1974 - Department of Defense policies37 
  1975 - Stratton Amendment38 
  1977 - Combat Exclusion Policy39 
  1978 - Public Law 95-48540 
  1979 - President Carter proposes repeal of combat exclusion restrictions 
  1981 - Rostker v. Goldberg41 
  1988 - Risk Rule42 
  1991 - Amendment No. 94843 
            - Amendment No. 94944 
            - Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 102-190)45 
 
                                               
33 Regulates employment discrimination. No determination as to applicability to the military. 
34 Removes percentage and grade limitations for women in military. 
35 Draft ends. Army and Navy open flight training to women.  
36 Dependents of women granted equal benefits. 
37 Pregnancy no longer cause for involuntary separation. Women permitted to enlist at 18 (previously 
21). 
38 Defense Authorization Bill permits women to enter service academies. 
39 Secretary of the Army issues exclusion policy regarding assignment of women to combat arms.  
40 Repeals WAC and integrates Army. Navy assigns women to sea duty aboard non-combatant ships. 
41 Congress upholds male-only draft via combat exclusion as justification. 
42 DoD Task Force on women in the Military established in response to Congressional requests stating 
that Noncombat units should be open to women unless there exists a high risk of exposure to direct combat, 
hostile fire, or capture. 
43 Senators Roth and Kenney call for repeal of combat exclusion laws. 
44 Senators Glenn, McCain, Nunn, and Warner call for temporary repeal of aviation combat exclusion 
laws. 
45 Congress repeals aviation combat exclusion laws and revises Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 6015. 
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 1992 - Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the 
Armed Forces46 
 - Army issues revised policy on the assignment of women47 
 1993 - Public Law 103–16048 
 -  Secretary of Defense Aspin issues Memorandum on Policy on 
the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces 
            - Risk Rule revised49 
 1994 - Secretary of Defense Aspin issues Memorandum on Direct Ground 
Combat Definition and Assignment Rule 
 2003 - Team Lioness50 
 2010 - Female Engagement Teams51 
            - Submarine exclusion amended52 
3. Current Governing Legislation, Policies, and Instructions 
The current legislation and policies governing American women in combat is a 
compilation of ambiguities and convoluted interpretations of wording. More often than 
not, “women’s role in the military and combat has been determined by a combination of 
law, policy, and practice.”53 Congressional legislature is only mandated by the 1995 
requirement that Department of Defense (DoD) officials notify Congress within thirty 
days of any intentions to modify existing assignment or collocation policies regarding 
                                               
46 Presents final report recommending aviation and ground combat jobs remain closed to women but 
recommend the opening of combat ships. 
47 See Army regulation 600–13. 
48 After Congress repeals laws prohibiting women on combat ships, Secretary of Defense Aspin 
directs the military to open both combat ships and aircraft to women. 
49 Secretary of Defense Aspin replaces the Risk rule with a definition of ground combat as that which 
bars women from units that engage the enemy with weapons on the ground while exposed to hostile fire 
and that involve substantial probability of direct physical contact with hostile forces. 
50 Army and Marine female service-members are assigned to forward deployed military and police 
search units operating in Iraq. 
51 Female Marines begin forward operations in Afghanistan for population engagement and counter-
insurgency. 
52 Secretary of the Navy announces the integration of female officers onboard certain submarine 
commands. 
53 Rosemarie Skaine. Women at War: Gender Issues of Americans in Combat. Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1999, 89. 
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women in ground combat units. The combat exclusion policies exist primarily within the 
DoD itself. The DoD’s current policy (incorporated under Secretary of Defense Les 
Aspin in 1994 upon the rescinding of the Risk Rule) states: “Service members are eligible 
to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be 
excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to 
engage in direct combat on the ground.”54 Furthermore, the Department of Defense 
defines direct ground combat as that which includes “engaging an enemy on the ground 
with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high 
probability of direct physical contact with the hostile forces’ personnel. Direct ground 
combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the 
enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect.”55  
The individual services each have established their own assignment policies 
regarding women. These policies are ever evolving and vary by method of determination 
across the board.56 For the USA, it is a coding system based upon occupational specialty, 
unit mission, and routine collocation,57 whereas for the USN it is a determination by the 
Secretary of the Navy based upon inputs regarding costs of appropriate berthing, 
feasibility of privacy arrangements, unit requirement to collocate with direct ground 
combat units, units conducting long term reconnaissance operations, special operations 
forces missions, and/or physical requirements associated with a particular assignment 
which would exclude the majority of female sailors.58  
As of 1998 nearly 15 percent of all armed forces positions are closed or restricted 
to women either because they are occupations whose primary mission includes direct 
                                               
54 The Secretary of Defense. “Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule.,”1. 
55 Ibid, 1.  
56 See Army Regulation 600–13, Marine Corps Order P1300.8R, Naval Operations Instruction 
1300.17B, and Air Force Instruction 36–2110. 
57 Secretary of the Army. “Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers.” Headquarters 
Department of the Army, Washington, DC. Regulation 600–13, 2. 
58 Chief of Naval Operations. “Assignment of Women in the Navy” Department of the Navy: Office 
of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC. OPNAV 1300.17B, 2. 
 21 
ground combat, they collocated with such units, operate on ships where costs prohibit 
living arrangement integration or they are special operations or reconnaissance units.59  
This translates to approximately 29 percent of USA positions, 25 percent of 
USMC, nine percent of USN (although this number has reduced with the final openings 
of remaining combat aviation units and certain submarine and mine countermeasure 
vessels), and less than one percent for the USAF.60  
The term combat is an ambiguous term in its application. “When it comes to 
women in the military, the all-purpose word is combat--it means whatever the services 
choose it to mean.”61 Unfortunately, these service specific policies require more specific 
considerations concerning implementation and are not necessarily particularly reflective 
of the greater Department of Defense policy. One such example is that of the Department 
of the Army, whose policy which actually predates the DoD’s, utilizes differing wording, 
stating that women are prohibited from assignment to units whose routine mission is 
direct combat in contrast to the Department of Defense’s primary mission verbiage. 
Furthermore, the USA definition of the concept of direct combat is not necessarily 
comparable, stating that direct combat incorporates the requirement for a substantial risk 
of capture as well as the aspect of repelling an assault.62 Perhaps the most compelling 
issue with the current policies is the utilization of highly ambiguous and debatable 
vocabulary. Words such as enemy, battlefront, forward, and direct combat are by no 
means definitive contextually nor are they standardized across the services. 
                                               
59 United States General Accounting Office: National Security and International Affairs Division. 
Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, 
U.S. Senate: Gender Issues: Information on DoD’s Assignment Policy and Direct Ground Combat 
Definition, 1998, 16. 
60 USGAO, 16. 
61 Holm, Jeanne., Major General USAF (Ret.). Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution. 
Revised Edition ed. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982, 398. 
62 Military Leadership Diversity Commission. Branching and Assignments. Arlington, VA: Military 
Leadership Diversity Commission, 2011, 2. 
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C. THE DEBATE 
Both advocates and opponents have fueled the debate regarding combat exclusion 
throughout the duration of American female militarization. 
1. Proponents 
Proponents of combat exclusion herald numerous justifications as discussed 
below. Conversely, the most dominantly utilized argument is simply that further research 
is required regarding this subject before arbitrary change in military policy pertaining to 
female integration is adopted. 
a. Social Norms 
Societal norms regarding gender relations particularly pertaining to armed 
conflict are by no means an American construct. Across the globe, most societies regard 
warfare as a domain of men. This is largely due to beliefs regarding the sanctity of 
womanhood and maternity. Women are defined largely by their capacity as bringers of 
life rather than death.63 Further justifications draw upon moral and religious texts and 
scriptures, citing that it is the imperative of civilized societies to protect women from the 
horrors of war. Oftentimes, the dominant rationalization incorporates the utilization of 
rape as a tool of war. These rationales are by no means diminished within American 
society. Military and civilian leaders have maintained that the American public is simply 
not willing to accept female service members returning home in body bags.  
b. Service Readiness 
A mainstay of the exclusion debate includes that of the effects the 
integration of women would have upon overall service readiness. Numerous variables 
comprise the compound of service readiness and the potential for negative effects on 
these facets by the inclusion of women. First of these facets is the sheer costs of 
integrating some units. Naval vessels, which already share limited berthing and bath 
                                               
63 Culler, “The Decision to Allow Military Women,”  25. 
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facilities, would require major retrofitting. Combat units would be ever concerned with 
the available facilities and opportunities for privacy for service members. The 
incorporation of women into these units presents a high demand economically as well as 
logistically. Women’s menstruation and hygiene requirements are vastly different from 
men’s.  
By far the most espoused arguments are those regarding sexual relations 
or fraternization, and pregnancy as diminishing contributions of the repeal of combat 
exclusion upon readiness. The basis for such arguments being that “sex is inevitable in 
mixed-gender units--that is what happens whenever men and women get together.”64 
Fraternization in the case of sexual relations can be detrimental to service readiness and 
member assignment capabilities. Pregnancy too has the unquestionable capacity to affect 
readiness should it be unplanned or poorly timed in a deployable unit. This is due 
primarily to the simple fact that “women are non-deployable while pregnant.”65 
Certainly, the removal of a pregnant female from a unit without replacement, thereby 
causing an undermanned situation, would diminish the overall readiness of that unit.  
Another component of the readiness debate is that regarding the current 
conscription exemption for women from the selected service registry also known as the 
draft. “If the ban were lifted, there would be no legal right for women to avoid the draft 
were it ever reinstituted.”66  Current combat exclusions were the justification in Rostker 
v. Goldberg (1981). The Supreme Court found that since women are excluded from 
combat and the sole purpose of a draft would be to raise troops for combat, it was within 
reason to solely require men to register for selected service.67 
                                               
64 Sara L. Ziegler and Gregory G. Gunderson. Moving Beyond G.I. Jane: Women and the U.S. 
Military. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005, 51. 
65 Adam N. Wojack. “Women can be Integrated into Ground Combat Units.” In Women in the 
Military, edited by James Haley, 27. Farmington Hills, MI: Greenhaven Press, 2004, 29. 
66 Culler, “The Decision to Allow Military Women,”  29. 
67 Several men sued the selective service system on the basis of sex discrimination. 
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c. Military Effectiveness 
Military effectiveness and its subcomponents are often utilized as 
justification for the continuation of established exclusion policies. “Military effectiveness 
is dependent on several variables”68 including unit cohesion, combat effectiveness and 
overall individual performance In a 1994 Department of Defense briefing regarding 
newly opened opportunities for women in the armed forces, the DoD maintained that the 
integration of women in ground combat units would not benefit the effectiveness of those 
units.69 
The most commonly espoused component of military effectiveness that 
proponents use for combat exclusion is unit cohesion. Most proponents claim that the 
integration of women in combat and particularly ground combat units can and would 
cause a detrimental degradation in the development and sustainment of the cohesion and 
solidarity of a combat unit. “Interference with the intangible quality of male bonding 
could damage a unit’s cohesion and readiness...”70 This is in part due to the believed 
introduction of the far more lenient and amiable environment women engender, in stark 
contrast to the harsh realities of combat. The presence of women is believed to hinder the 
ability of men to adequately bond over high standards and competition.71 While the 
introduction of women may not hinder esprit de corps (which reflects a sense of binding 
to the larger group) or morale (which reflects an individual’s personal feelings), a unit’s 
cohesiveness is reflective of the feelings that tie individuals to each other within a 
particular or given group.72 Cohesion can be detrimentally affected by cross-gender 
relations, specifically those involving sexuality, favoritism, or double-standards; 
regardless of whether these instances are in actuality or simply perceived. 
                                               
68 Darlene M. Iskra, CDR, USN (ret), PhD. Women in the United States Armed Forces: A Guide to the 
Issues (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 24. 
69 USGAO, 6. 
70 Culler, “The Decision to Allow Military Women,”  28. 
71 Brian Mitchell. Women in the Military: Flirting with Disaster. Washington, DC: Regnery 
Publishing Inc., 1998, 175. 
72  Anna Simons. “Women Will Reduce the Effectiveness of Ground Combat Units.” In Women in the 
Military, edited by James Haley, 39. Farmington Hills, MI: Greenhaven Press, 2004, 44. 
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d. Gender Limitations 
The common argument that “women are weaker than men”73 for the 
continuation of current combat exclusion is that of the inherent biological, psychological 
and sociological dissimilarities between the male and female of the human species and 
how those pertain to combat performance and capability. Physically, the average woman 
is well below the standards of the average male.74 Currently, the services incorporate 
gender-normative dual standard physical fitness tests in obvious consideration of the 
lower physical capabilities of the average female. The biological differences created by 
the increased levels of testosterone and its inherent tough and aggressive tendencies are 
more in accordance with the demands of combat. Proponents often cite the psychological 
trauma of combat and the inability of the average women to cope with such stressors and 
their increased susceptibility to post-traumatic stress disorders as a result of combat or 
sexual trauma. Women are often less capable of coping successfully with these stressors 
in a timely manner or setting them aside as the situation dictates. Concerns include that 
“women... are not impressed with physical prowess, do not relish competition, are not 
intrigued by danger, do not need to prove their manhood, and see little reason to hide 
their weaknesses, psychological or physical.”75 
e. Perceptions 
A less common yet still prevalent argument regards the perception of the 
American armed forces, both domestically and globally. Traditionally, the military has 
been viewed as a bastion of the masculine elite. The concern therein is that with the 
continued inclusion and growing numbers of women under arms, the traditional domestic 
perception of the American military as one of a highly regarded institution will diminish. 
Subsequently, the services will no longer be capable of recruiting the numbers of high 
                                               
73 Ziegler et al., Moving Beyond G.I. Jane, 54. 
74 Women are on average shorter, contain lower percentages of total muscle mass, contain higher 
percentages of total body fat, have lighter frames and less bone density, and contain smaller vital organs as 
in heart or lungs necessary for severe aerobic activity.  
75 Brian Mitchell. “Women Lack the Physical Strength to be Soldiers.” In Women in the Military, 
edited by James Haley, 12: Greenhaven Press, 2004, 170. 
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quality, motivated personnel required. Furthermore the inclusion of women in combat 
units would likely be used as fodder for anti-American rhetoric amongst American 
enemies.76 This can be detrimental twofold. First, foreign societies might seek to 
demonstrate that the United States suffers from an entrenched vulnerability, for while 
else would they send a woman to do a man’s job, in this case fight a “man’s war.”77 
Moreover enemies would endeavor to motivate individual troops, none of whom would 
be willing to suffer the humiliation of defeat at the hands of a woman. Perhaps most 
concerning though, is the trepidation that the inclusion of women could potentially cause 
rifts with allies whose society still maintains a more traditional perspective of femininity 
and the appropriate roles for each gender. Certainly, female service members have 
experienced difficulties in conducting joint operations around the globe due to the 
perspectives of their non-American counterparts.78   
2. Opponents 
Opponents of existing combat exclusions also cite many of the same justifications 
for their opposition. Predominantly, the appeal is for an opening of opportunities where 
the Secretary of Defense is granted the authority to determine how and when the services 
begin to open combat units to women based on actual capabilities of service members, 
logistics, economics, and training rather than blanket exclusion.  
a. Social Norms  
Like their proponent counterparts, opponents of combat exclusion 
recognize the influence of societal restraints associated with such change and the 
dynamics of gender relations. Yet they maintain that the continuous strides of women in 
civil society should correspondingly be reflected within the military assignment policies. 
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“Women’s roles in our society and culture also have changed over time.”79 Long gone 
are the days of a woman’s place being in the home and a man’s duty to protect the 
women of his society. “A cherished position in one era is discarded for another.”80 Public 
opinion and societal norms are a fluid and ever-evolving entity. While some religious and 
ethical beliefs regarding the division of duties for the genders may remain, mainstream 
America has come to relegate this as an anomaly. While women may or may not choose 
to do so, the overwhelming majority of Americans believe in the right of each individual 
to pursue goals based solely on an individual’s capability, regardless of gender, ethnicity, 
race, creed, or religion. This is in stark contrast to the blatant discrimination entailed in 
combat exclusion. Furthermore, the advancements in modern technology and weaponry 
have so altered the battlefield landscape that the likelihood of mass combat casualties the 
likes of World War II are highly unlikely. Arguably, past concerns of American 
acceptance of mass numbers of women returning home in body bags are irrelevant in this 
day and age. 
Proponents citing social norms often utilize the rape factor as justification 
for the exclusion of women from combat. Opponents are quick to point out that the 
concept of rape is by no means a female specific threat; it is a human issue. Male 
combatants and prisoners of war are just as capable of being subjected to this horrific act 
and are just as likely to suffer the detrimental psychological and emotional trauma 
resulting from such violations. Female guards, as in the case of Abu Ghraib, are also 
capable of sexual mistreatment of prisoners. Opponents maintain that such gender 
stereotyping arguments detract from the true reality that the horrors of war, both for 
combatants and noncombatants, are applicable to both genders. 
b. Service Readiness 
Opponents also recognize the imperatives for optimum service readiness. 
Yet, they argue that the exclusion of women from combat is in fact detrimental to this 
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issue rather than beneficial. “A gender-neutral policy will allow the most capable force to 
be assembled.”81 Should women be excluded completely from the military services, it is 
likely that none would be able to achieve their enlistment requirements. Following 
Vietnam and the incorporation of the All Volunteer Force, recruitment and retention have 
been difficult and the utilization of women has eased many of the strains caused by the 
unavailability of willing men. Since women are required due to these constraints to be a 
part of the military than it seems sensible to utilize them in the best capacity given their 
individual capabilities. This would likely enhance both service readiness as well as 
efficiency. This argument is certainly demonstrated by the recent inclusion of women 
into the Navy’s submarine community. Women account for more than fifty percent of the 
United States’ academia’s technical degrees. “It is more important now to have the 
superior technical skill, intelligence, and training...”82 In order to attract the most 
qualified personnel for such positions, the Navy has opened the doors for qualified 
technical expertise women into this previously excluded community. 
Unfortunately, issues with fraternization and pregnancy are legitimate 
concerns of proponents. Opponents maintain that with the incorporation of proper 
leadership and discipline, such concerns will be few and far between.  Modern 
technology has made the means of reproduction and pregnancy controllable by women. 
In fact, “the Presidential Commission found that, on the average, women are available 
only one hour a month less than men because of maternity leave.”83 More importantly, 
the benefits to readiness, which the incorporation of women entails, far outweigh any 
possible detriment these issues might cause. 
Regrettably, “While many rights and responsibilities of citizenship such as 
voting, serving on a jury, or working and paying taxes are burdens of all citizens, the 
right to fight remains unresolved.”84 With regards to the selected service or draft 
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component of the readiness argument, according to the Selected Service Act of 1948 
Section 1(c), “the Congress further declares that in a free society the obligations and 
privileges of serving in the armed forces and the reserve components thereof should be 
shared generally, in accordance with a system of selection which is fair and just...”85 This 
statement reflects the ideals that with the rights and privileges of an American citizenship 
comes certain responsibilities and obligations. It is not until Section 3 regarding 
registration where the delineation between the genders is annotated.86 Still, in Rostker v. 
Goldberg, the Supreme Court upheld the mandate that only males were required to 
register for the draft. Nevertheless, their decision against equal protection was predicated 
upon the reasoning that since women were excluded from combat the United States 
would not benefit from including them in the selected service registration.87 This debate 
brought about the subsequent argument that while women were being denied their 
individual rights by denial from selected service, men were also being forced to shoulder 
undue and disproportionate responsibilities in order to take up the slack. 
c. Military Effectiveness 
It is certainly feasible that the military should utilize the best man for the 
job even if it is a woman. Consequently, “military effectiveness requires that we pick the 
best qualified person for the job regardless of gender.”88 Opponents argue that any 
diminished or lowering of standards in order to accommodate women in certain positions 
are a result of poor leadership and should not be utilized as fodder for a complete 
exclusion of all women from certain assignments. 
As a result of the induction of the all-volunteer force, .”..our more 
forward-thinking political and military leaders began to realize that morale and cohesion, 
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and therefore effectiveness, suffered under discriminatory rules and regulations.”89 
Opponents of exclusion contend that what is best for the military as a whole, with regards 
to unit cohesion and combat effectiveness, is the ability of personnel to fill any position at 
any time if individually capable. Cohesion or bonding must be divided between that of 
social and that of task oriented. While gender divided groups may be prevalent among 
social cohesion, task cohesion is predicated on the notion that members simply share 
commitment to a collaborative effort or cause regardless of gender.90 By this logic, the 
inclusion of women would have no bearing on the capacity of units to bond; rather the 
emphasis must lie on proper leadership in order to emphasize task cohesion over social 
cohesion.  
To date, there has been little evidence that the integration of women into 
previously closed units or occupations has had a negative impact on 
important mission-related performance factors, such as unit cohesion... In 
a study by DACOWITS in 2009, a majority of service members who were 
part of the study’s focus groups said that women serving in combat roles, 
such as ‘on convoys, as drivers, or otherwise traveling between camps-- 
and participating in female search teams, including the Lioness program’ 
in Iraq and Afghanistan did not have a negative impact on unit morale.91  
d. Gender Abilities 
Opponents of exclusion are often confronted with the reality that the 
biological capacities of the genders are different. Yet while they recognize that the 
overwhelming majority of women would be incapable of performing combat oriented 
tasks, this is not to say that there are not many women who would thrive and perform 
these tasks well, if not better than some of their male counterparts. The arbitrary 
exclusion of women also fails to reflect the ability of women to overcome initial 
biological depravations. This argument maintains that despite the fact that the majority of 
women would be incapable of participating in combat units, the complete exclusion of 
women forces units to accept weaker men rather than stronger female peers. In fact many 
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women are currently fully qualified for positions but unable to be assigned due to the 
exclusion policy. .”... There is not much direct evidence to support claims that all women 
lack the physical ability to perform in combat roles... Likewise, research does not indicate 
that women are necessarily less able than men to deal with the emotional ramifications of 
combat.”92  Opponents maintain that the majority of so-called biological and 
psychological attributes that distinguish men from women are in reality a reflection of the 
social construct of gender. The gendering of traits, attributes, and duties is not necessarily 
a biological or psychological characteristic but rather a result of societal pressures and 
beliefs on what is appropriate behavior for men and what is appropriate for women. Such 
behaviors can be overcome with adequate training.  
e. Equal Opportunity 
Finally, equal opportunity is perhaps the core argument used against 
combat exclusion. The notions of citizenship and civic responsibility weigh heavily here. 
Opponents often hearken back to the suffragette movement. Is the ability to serve in the 
armed forces an inalienable right, an obligation, or a privilege? Opponents argue that the 
concept of exclusion from service, based on gender, limits women’s inherent rights to 
citizenship and participation. Specifically, that “either all are citizens with all rights and 
obligations, or they are not citizens at all.”93 Opponents utilize the promotional 
hindrances such policies inevitably entail. Equal rights and equal opportunity go hand in 
hand, and the limits upon female service members’ rights prevent them from having the 
same career opportunities of their male counterparts. According to the Equal Rights 
Amendment passed in 1972, “states, ‘equality of rights under the law shall not be denied 
or abridged... on account of sex.’”94 
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D. IN THE LINE OF FIRE 
1. The Realities of Afghanistan and the Global War on Terror 
The United States’ incursions into Iraq and Afghanistan (for Operations Enduring 
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom respectively) have once again brought to light the combat 
exclusion debate. In fact, “some 20,000 of the 205, 000 service members currently 
serving in Afghanistan are women.”95 The reality of the battlefield is no longer a vertical 
linear warfront where combatant troops are easily identifiable and entrenched across 
well-delineated front lines, as came to be known in the twentieth century. The very nature 
of a counterinsurgency is its fuzziness. Not only is the battlefield not easily 
distinguishable neither are the enemies. Such a hazy environment of asymmetric warfare 
and horizontal front lines has left American leadership, both military and political, in a 
dilemma. How do American troops meet the needs of such warfare while still reflecting 
the dictates of combat exclusion? 
Oftentimes, throughout the war, the services have found themselves in keeping 
with the letter of the law but perhaps not necessarily the spirit. “Given the difficulty of 
predicting and isolating ‘direct combat’ in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), there are 
claims that the Department of Defense (DoD) is currently violating the Combat Exclusion 
Policy...”96 The utilization of terms in combat exclusion policies, such as well forward 
and exposure to hostile fire, have made such determinations difficult since most of the 
operating area in Afghanistan lacks a clearly defined forward operating area.97 This 
lacking has enabled the reality that nearly all units in Afghanistan are vulnerable to attack 
and hostile fire regardless of combat unit delineations.  
Further complicating the issue, are the aforementioned faults with the current 
Department of Defense and service specific policies. These policies focus more on the 
assignment of women rather than the utilization of them. Women have found themselves 
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increasingly involved in ground combat altercations since the Department of Defense 
policies are merely reflective of restrictions on the assignment of women and not 
necessarily on the capabilities nor on the circumstantial requirements of women in the 
field. Female service members have received Silver Stars, Bronze Stars, Air Medals, and 
Commendations medals for combat experiences and services rendered. Although women 
remain unassigned to formal combat units in accordance with prevailing policies, more 
and more they have become engaged in combat related activities and engagements in 
Afghanistan. This obvious disconnect between the realities of Afghanistan and current 
policies has made the operational environment a minefield for military leadership looking 
to navigate combat exclusion. As a result of these ambiguities between October 2001 and 
February 2010, at least 20 female service members have died and 50 wounded in action 
in Operation Enduring Freedom.98 
2. Female Engagement Teams 
In July of 2010, Female Engagement Team members were summarily recalled to 
secure operating bases to await an official review of their compliance with the combat 
exclusion directives. After three weeks of debate, military leadership clarified that they 
could not participate in hunt and kill foot patrols and were not allowed more than 
temporary stays at combat bases. Later, Major General Richard Mills would clarify a 
temporary stay as 45 days. It seems apparent that in order “to fulfill the letter but hardly 
the spirit of the guidelines, the female marines now travel from their combat outposts 
every six weeks for an overnight stay at a big base like Camp Leatherneck, then head 
back out the next morning.”99 For the Female Engagement Teams, combat exclusion has 
been a murky policy whose restrictions are increasingly difficult to apply and yet still 
garner the successful completion of the mission at hand. Fifty percent of surveyed 
responses stated that they felt, given the Title 10 U.S.C. definition, the Female 
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Engagement Teams were inherently in violation of this policy. The most common 
argument is the distinction between the letter and the spirit of the law. In fact many 
seemed to relish in the opportunity to blur the lines between those deemed appropriate 
positions for women and those withheld due to combat operations. The question is 
twofold. First, whether a support unit remains identifiable as such when they leave the 
forward operating base and enter into infantry operations maneuvers or whether they are 
now identifiable as combat units. Secondly, whether a unit which engages in direct 
support of combat operations, but whose primary mission is not such, in fact is by default 
a combat unit. 
Female Engagement Teams by their very nature do appear to violate the letter of 
the combat exclusion restrictions but are a vital asset to operations in Afghanistan. 
Commanders have sought to go around the restrictions by high revolution movements of 
female units. They set timelines and regulate intervals by which women must return to 
bases before returning to the field in order to keep with the restrictions on prolonged 
collocation with units whose primary mission is direct ground combat but by no means 
does this appear to be in keeping with the spirit of the policy. The gains from having 
them in the field appear to be worth the risk.  
3. The Future of Combat Exclusion  
In February 2012, the Department of Defense issued a policy change request to 
Congress in keeping with the 1995 Congressional directive for notification of Department 
of Defense intent to open positions to women. This policy change reflected a 
recommendation by the Military Leadership Diversity Commission of March 2011, to 
open more combat support positions to women in order to enhance diversity within the 
Department of Defense.100  The request stands to open upwards of 10,000 positions to 
female service members.101 It serves to lift the ban on women serving in units that simply 
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operate in close proximity to combat units and enables an “exception to policy,”102 which 
permits the services to open specific positions at the lower ranks in combat support 
positions including intelligence, communications, and logistics.   
Certainly, the successes seen by females serving in both Afghanistan and Iraq 
have facilitated such a change in policy. The Female Engagement Teams particularly 
represent the potential strategic and operational opportunities that are being stifled by 
current combat exclusion criterion and “through their courage, sacrifice, patriotism and 
great skill, women have proven their ability to serve in an expanding number of roles on 
and off the battlefield”103 The continued success of such units in both Afghanistan and 
similar future engagements will likely enable this trend to continue and the inevitable 
dismantling of combat exclusion. Nonetheless, time will tell both which debate rings true 
and whether the integration of women into combat units can be done smoothly. 
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IV. WOMEN AND COUNTERINSURGENCY 
A. WOMEN MATTER 
It is important when discussing the Female Engagement Teams to understand 
their symbiotic relationship to counterinsurgency operations and strategies. Strong 
counterinsurgent movements must negotiate the human terrain and tap into the wellspring 
of female networks and relationships. These networks extend differently than their male 
counterparts but are by no means less integral to the movement. Women offer the 
capacity to reach into the home and extract information often beyond the reach of 
traditional kinetic operations. 
B. INSURGENCY VERSUS COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Insurgents utilize the ungoverned spaces of society and tacit acceptance by the 
local populace to garner support both psychological and temporal.104 By definition, .”..an 
insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the 
control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political 
authority while increasing insurgent control.”105 Certainly this is what the International 
Security Assistance Forces are encountering in Afghanistan. As a result, the reemergence 
of counterinsurgency as a dominant military doctrine has occurred. Counterinsurgency or 
COIN is an all-encompassing term used to portray the entirety of the actions taken to 
overcome insurgent movements.106 Both constructs have appeared throughout history 
and continue to evolve within the given environment. One fact, however, remains 
constant; the insurgent movement’s requisite for local populace support and/or 
acceptance. This populace incorporates both genders and as such any effective COIN 
strategy must address both sides. 
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C. AMERICAN COUNTERINSURGENCY 
American relations with insurgent movements have been varied and the utilization 
of a COIN doctrine has never been more prominent as with the War on Terror in 
Afghanistan. The particular Indirect Approach focuses on “the use of indigenous troops, 
the goodwill of the people, societal reconstruction, and the host government’s legitimacy, 
policies, and conduct.”107 Unfortunately, despite doctrinal recognition that emphasis 
must lie on population security and intelligence, too often military tactics and strategies 
fail to reflect this focus.108 There are a few basic tenets that bind the basic dynamics of 
insurgent warfare. Firstly, the counterinsurgent unlike his insurgent counterpart is bound 
by truth and damaged by overt shows of force. Furthermore, anonymity is detrimental to 
the counterinsurgent yet beneficial to the insurgent.109 Therefore, the informational and 
intelligence networks that both groups must tap into are vital and even more so to the 
counterinsurgent operation. Certainly, the imperative within a counterinsurgency must 
recognize and lie within the human terrain. Subsequently, “the population is regarded not 
just as a means to an end, but as the end itself.”110 
Human intelligence (HUMINT), intelligence gathering, and information 
operations are a vital facet of any successful counterinsurgency. Static or embedded 
forces develop human intelligence gathering capabilities and can gain unprecedented 
knowledge regarding the local population and the insurgency. Such intelligence usually 
provides the majority of valid and actionable data for tactical military operations. This 
data is often derived from local civil-military relations and operations.111 Yet, American 
COIN operations in Afghanistan too often neglect well over fifty percent of the 
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population when attempting to garner such intelligence; women. American COIN 
strategy should reflect both genders and the culture within which they operate in order to 
fully capitalize on the human terrain. Such strategies must reflect both genders and the 
cultural and religious society in which they function. 
D. NETWORKS 
1. Insurgent Networks 
An apt COIN in Afghanistan necessitates the understanding and utilization of the 
societal and tribal networks within which the insurgent movements maneuver and 
“appreciating societal and operational distinctions will aid in the application of the 
Indirect Approach.”112  Insurgent networks operate upon the predication that their source 
of power is derived from the local population within which they operate. Particularly, 
“Afghan culture is primarily a system of interlocking and overlapping networks, based on 
ties of kinship, religion, tribe, ethnicity, locality, patronage and common interests.”113 
This is certainly true for the main insurgent movements within Afghanistan; the Taliban, 
Hezb-i-Islami, Haqqani network, foreign fighters, Pashtun tribes of Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, and criminal networks This base of power is derived from below the 
detection threshold of counterinsurgent efforts.114 Therefore, “networks conduct 
operational activity to influence popular perceptions, which requires a close 
synchronization with information strategy.”115  
Nearly half of the insurgent and counterinsurgent base population in Afghanistan 
is female. U.S. military doctrine specifically points out that women are incredibly 
influential in the formation and sustainment of the social networks that the insurgents use 
to garner both physical support and tacit approval.116 Understanding how to tap into these 
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networks is vital to any successful COIN strategy. This includes those networks both 
wielded and influenced by the female population. 
2. Female Networks 
While most insurgent fighters are in fact men, women can be greatly influential 
through their own networks.117 Women are oft considered a secondary subject in 
counterinsurgency strategies despite the reality that they make up half the population. In 
spite of this, any successful attempt at such incentives will require consideration of this 
portion of the population and its participation within. Organized insurgent and terrorist 
organizations globally have seen varying levels of female participation. In particular, 
women have served in diverse levels of active and supportive positions. Traditionally 
these roles have been overlooked by researchers and identified as those simply filled by 
wives, sisters and mothers. Subordination, secrecy, and the subversive nature of these 
organizations have contributed to this neglect. Yet despite this omission, women have 
played vital and ever changing roles within the organizations’ structures. In particular, 
they serve as the most prevalent link between these organizations, society and the state. 
Whether it be on the sidelines as mothers or as active support participants themselves, 
completely ignoring their existence is unwise given the intricacy of their relations to the 
traditional patriarchal leadership. Any successful counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 
strategy from the state must reflect a consideration for this half of the population and the 
integral part it plays in the continuance, evolution, activities, and strength of terrorist and 
insurgent organizations. 
E. FEMALE PARTICIPATION 
1. Gender and Violence 
We should start with one simple fact: most insurgents are male. This does not 
however imply that an insurgency is somehow a masculine entity. In fact many studies 
refute the gender normative based arguments suggesting that female and male criminals 
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differ strictly in quantity rather than quality and that social determinants such as 
disaffection and poverty play the largest determinant role.118 Surely, “gender per se does 
not seem to have determined the differences in attitudes to the exercises of violence: 
which were the product of individual character and experience.”119 Furthermore, the 
historical constraints placed on women are a reasonable cause leading to this division of 
numbers. The recent rise in female violence within insurgent movements is likely a direct 
reflection of “the process of emancipation, assimilating the female model into the male, 
would automatically bring a rise in female criminality and thus an increase by women of 
aggressive and violent behavior.”120 Subsequently, the growing global liberation of 
women and their emergence from more traditional roles in society and family dictate that 
as these social restrictions on their activity are removed, so their participation in criminal 
activities will rise. 
Historically female marginalization is most often defined in opposition to a male 
dominated system of power.121  
If women are less into crime and are relatively less successful at it, this is 
less a result of single-mindedness in the rational pursuit of crime than 
because they lack access to organizations and social contacts that would 
enable them to pursue criminal enterprise more safely and profitably.122  
Traditionally, those already in power, i.e. men, define women’s roles. Women’s 
roles are traditionally defined by those already in power, i.e. men. Subsequently, the 
evolution of female violence and its recent rise is oft met with disdain and seen as 
unnatural and exceptional and therefore arbitrarily ignored by counterinsurgents and 
.”..precisely by assuming this point of view... deviant women are required, almost as a 
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complement, to have an exceptional nature, with all that term’s many different shades, 
shifting from the mythical dimension to the pathological.”123 States and their polities 
have notoriously continued to buy into this misconceived viewpoint and rarely address, if 
at all, the female components of their organized criminal elements rather relegating them 
to sidelines as unique examples of derangement or hyper-masculinity. Women’s 
capacities within insurgent movements as tacit acceptors, arbiters of radicalization, and 
support systems emphasize the contradictory nature of this point. Women linked to 
violence or criminal activities need not necessarily be deranged or lacking in some 
essential feminine characteristic. Rather female participation in insurgency activity can 
be a direct reflection of feminine attributes and traditional roles. 
2. Family Versus Family 
As with other elements of states with a long-standing tradition of patriarchy, the 
concepts of family and society are integral to Afghan insurgent organizations. Like most 
organized criminal societies based upon agrarian rural communities, the insurgency 
emerged professing the ideals of honor and duty. Affiliates are drawn from existing 
member’s relations and from all classes and social orders and “one of the things the 
research reveals is the central place of the family, both the external family, interpersonal 
dynamics, and the internal family, the psychic family field that all members share in it 
historicity, which is inside each individual and structures his or her identity.”124 The 
external family or traditional immediate family unit informs every individual; a 
traditional Afghan culture has solidified its imperative in daily life. Individual lives are 
determined by familial relations rather than individual freedom of choice, thereby 
strengthening the family unit. For women, these relationships define them both as 
mothers and as protectors. Fathers are the arbiters of violence and discipline whereas 
mothers represent safety and comfort. This position wields them immense influence, 
albeit likely indirectly, in much of the organizations activities as their children grow into 
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their own positions within the organization. Husbands confide in wives, children come to 
mother for advice, and sisters link kin throughout. 
Concomitantly, in the organized structures of the Afghan insurgent subculture, the 
term family extends beyond immediate and extended blood relations. This psychic or 
internalized sense of family and the family unit coincide with the organizations family 
resulting in a fundamentalist-type psychic identity. The Afghan is born into a family that 
is fundamental to his world (i.e., uncles are of fundamental importance). A child is 
identified by the family as a future warrior, if male, or wife of a warrior, if female. As a 
family these units become intricately interwoven and can even surpass the allegiances felt 
towards the biological and affective family. Similar to the family unit, insurgency 
organizational structures have their own representations as a Family. Ritualized linkages 
such as marriage, tradition and fraternity unite the Family. The Family is the all-
protective mother where one must turn towards. For insurgents absolute respect and 
subordination is due to the organization, similarly to that which they garner their 
biological parents. The violent males are the individual actors within the organization 
enacting its violence and discipline. This depiction only serves to reinforce the influence 
women may wield within the organization at least over her immediate and extended 
blood relations. These two notions of family and Family can at times come into direct 
competition for an individual’s loyalty and “…in societies where kinship remained the 
primary basis of solidary relations, fraternal association was effective because it used 
quasi-kin relations to extend bonds of loyalty and obligation beyond the family, to 
incorporate people into kin networks, or to create new relations having some of the force 
of kinship.”125 The use of kinship ties to strengthen the bonds within the insurgency can 
at times pit the two against one another. In the case of the insurgency, the Family must at 
times supersede the family. Women are drawn into the insurgency or Family and remain 
loyal for the very same reasons as their male counterparts and efforts to counter such 
loyalties must address both genders. 
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3. Traditional Female Roles 
Certainly women hold far less overt power, yet that isn’t the entire story. 
Accordingly, “we should ask whom is manipulating whom.”126 Much of their influence 
occurs in spheres of dominion divergent from their male counterparts. The current 
literature overlooks the many capacities by which women interact with organized 
insurgency structures and hierarchy and relegates much of their activity either in terms of 
its relation to male roles (i.e. mothers, wives, daughters, lovers etc.) or in other various 
supporting roles. In reality they provide integral components and serve a vast array of 
functions within the insurgent support system127 and “it is shortsighted, therefore, to 
assume that because the Afghan woman has a repressed status in the public sphere, she is 
therefore irrelevant in the private sphere.”128 Among the many possible female 
contributions, the main functions performed by Afghan women are as follows: 
 Women strengthen ties between families through specific matrimonial 
strategies. 
 The female role is central in educational and socializing processes. 
 The important relationship with the sacred, religion, and the Islamic faith is 
prevalently left to female management.  
 The role of women is strategic in communication processes. 
 Women are also the vehicles for maintaining a respectable image of the 
insurgent movement. (i.e. the Pashtunwali concept of nang or chivalry where 
a man’s honor or izzat is determined by his ability to protect namus or the 
honor of his women) 
 Women generally contribute to giving the insurgency a normal face and, in 
virtue of this presume normality, help to foster general approval of the 
movement. 
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 They also become symbolic instruments and victims in ‘badal’ (cross-
vendettas or revenge). 
 They are useful in counteracting control by the police and judicial 
authorities.129 
For the first point, the strengthening of ties through intermarriage and matrimonial 
strategies, this has traditionally been the utmost participatory function served by women. 
The solidification of alliances via marriage is older than any insurgency. They serve as a 
strategic function of allying clans, consolidating power, and mending relations. Both 
male and female future insurgents must obtain permission before marrying from the 
family and even at times the Family in order to ensure their unions serve the greater good 
of the tribe or insurgency.  
With regards to the female roles of education and socialization; these are perhaps 
the principal roles and contributions of Afghan women. As first a wife and then a mother, 
it is her duty to reinforce the ideals of the insurgency within her immediate relatives and 
eventually to raise her children in keeping with the insurgency’s principles, thereby 
ensuring that the two worlds become indistinguishable. “The fact that 44.6% of the 
Afghan population is under the age of 14 underscores the need to engage the women who 
are the caregivers and thus the primary influencers of the next generation in their 
youth...”130 and since integration and indoctrination of outside potential affiliates is 
difficult due to the familial based nature of the network, it is imperative that new 
generations be raised within the organization’s structure. Women serve to inculcate a set 
of values that later become normality. Women may not hold much official power within 
these organizations; however they wield significant domestic authority over their 
households and their children’s futures. Consequently, “when women support COIN 
efforts, families support COIN efforts.”131 
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The Islamic faith represents a crucial area of intersection between the insurgency 
and the society within which it operates. Since women are seen as the carriers of the 
divine and sacred, they are well positioned to act as intermediaries between the 
organization and the community. This presence of a non-threatening feminine image in 
society permits the community to feel less threatened and thereby more accepting of the 
insurgency and its activities. Professions of faith and community reinforce these feelings, 
put a positive face on the insurgency and maintain its respectable image and tacit 
acceptance by the populace.   
Female components of the organizations serve vital functions as communicators. 
They are often at the center of the daily village gossip. Through frequent intermarriage, 
women promote communication, solidarity and cooperation among the various factions 
of the insurgency. The common conception is that the men of Afghan society have honor 
whereas the women are the honor. Women are typically considered to be 
uncontaminated. Therefore, attacks on women can represent a significant blow to the 
insurgency’s esteem as in the cases of badal (revenge). This can transcend to attempts at 
infiltration by police or state apparatuses via women as an attack on their honor.   
For many insurgent organizations female active participation beyond traditional 
support mechanisms is relatively low. Despite the occasional cases where insurgent 
women have sought to transform from intimate support systems to leading protagonists, 
the fact remains that the majority of women operate in a hierarchical system dominated 
by patriarchal authoritarianism and male exclusivity. In traditional societies, “gender 
roles remain rigidly circumscribed.”132 This is most certainly the case in Afghanistan 
where women are highly constrained by political agendas, cultural norms and traditions, 
and religious interpretations.  
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F. COIN 
1. Women and COIN 
At its core, COIN initiatives seek to facilitate crucial information engagement at 
the base local and tribal levels with an emphasis in face-to-face personal relations and 
exchanges. The population is the insurgency’s center of gravity and any successful COIN 
strategy must reflect this. For much of Afghanistan’s history, the state has remained 
relatively weak and unable to fully penetrate these societies, while popular culture and 
society has held tight to age-old traditions and an emphasis on family and community. 
Continued and widespread poverty and unemployment in country have enabled continued 
growth and infiltration of the insurgency in nearly every polity of the state. Since women 
participate in the enterprise syndicate they are well positioned as a communicatory 
intermediary. Thus, by operating nearby and in coordination with the indigenous 
population, counterinsurgents can gain the credibility necessary to garner information. 
Yet women are often left out of any significant COIN operations.  
The absence of women from much of strategic and tactical COIN thinking is 
likely a result of various misinformed assumptions. Women wield little to no influence in 
Afghan culture and society. They must be weak, subjugated and forced to hide behind 
walls and blue burqus. As previously stated, these arguments lack validity and are 
predicated on an entirely Westernized perception of female empowerment and influence. 
“It is important to stress that women carry power in all cultures and society, but not 
always in the same way.”133 Thus, “it is critical... to try and understand the types of 
influence women have in society and how this influence could be leveraged in a COIN 
environment”134 As wives, mothers, daughters, and sisters, women can provide a crucial 
capacity to influence their male counterparts.  
As central components of tribal and village life, women serve as a valuable source 
of information for COIN operatives. Yet leadership has oft expressed concerns that such 
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a portion a population that is extremely difficult to access represents little benefit given 
the cost and effort to reach them. Then again, so long as consideration is given to the 
tribal and religious constraints of the Afghan society, COIN operatives can certainly 
maneuver around such restrictions. Women “are also a key population whose trust must 
be earned and respected in order to help win the community’s support against 
insurgents.”135 While access may be difficult and if mishandled could result in long 
lasting acrimony and hostility, the benefits are both real and substantial with regards to 
intelligence gathering and bottom-up counterinsurgency operations. 
2. Female Engagement Teams and COIN 
Strong COIN strategies recognize the importance of the female component of the 
population and utilize focused measures to reach them. “Operationally, most successful 
counter-insurgent forces are light infantry or special operations type forces...”136 and one 
such special operation force is that of the Female Engagement Teams, which represent a 
unique and relatively unprecedented attempt to tap into the female portion of the 
population. These teams derive from the understanding that given their own networks and 
influences “women are ideal conduits to communicate IO messages” and “women are 
ideal intelligence sources.”137 Female unit members are gathering vital human and 
operational intelligence from women who see all within their village and community. 
Therefore, “women are at the center of village life and valuable sources of intelligence 
for counterinsurgents.”138 A bottom-up approach to garnering such information requires 
the capacity to enable women to communicate with counterinsurgents. The FETs reflect 
one of the sole capacities to facilitate such interaction. These teams are deemed 
nonthreatening to both the society, culture, and tribal norms that even at times, male 
Afghans find it more amenable to communicate information to female counterinsurgents 
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than to their male peers and in fact “female Marines elicit more information from male 
Afghans than their male counterparts.”139 
The Female Engagement Teams represent a unique opportunity to act as force 
multiplier in Afghanistan, gaining the biggest bang for the buck as it were. They have 
been utilized in nearly every stage of the counterinsurgency cycle to ensure maximum 
operational effectiveness; including the clear, hold, and build phases.140 They are best 
utilized as a component of the traditional oil spot approach to counterinsurgency where 
they can build lasting and fruitful relationships.141 Survey responses highlighted 
instances where  Female Engagement Teams were able to conduct searches of females 
and support large scale infantry operations that lead to the discovery of several Taliban 
operatives including caches of money and drugs as well as gain vital intelligence from the 
wives of key Taliban leaders in a given  operating area. These and other instances not 
only enabled the COIN operatives to gain key atmospherics and information, it allowed 
them on more than one occasion to gain ground on the enemy.  
G. CONCLUSION 
It is imperative to recognize that in a policy of people-centric COIN, “ignoring 
half the population means missing significant opportunities to gain intelligence and build 
trust within Afghan communities.”142 By solely addressing only half of the population, 
International Security Assistance Forces fail to understand the most appropriate means by 
which to direct their lines of activities and operations. The state and American 
counterinsurgency strategists are beginning to recognize the vital importance women play 
within insurgent movements and their sustainability. The future of the insurgency can at 
times be dependent upon the continuation of affiliates indoctrinated at birth from their 
mother’s either passionate, avid, and devoted support of the Family or simple tacit 
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acceptance. Women have traditionally and continue to play an integral role in the 
continuation and indoctrination of the insurgent elements of Afghanistan. Their integral 
position is predicated on relationships; relationships within the family, within the Family, 
within factions, within the community, and within the state.  
Dense kinship relationships flourish among men of honor and their families. This 
notion of honor and family extends to the women of these organizations as well. The 
level of female participation varies from tacit acceptance to intimate support mechanisms, 
both integral to the insurgency’s survival. Regardless of the level of their participation,  
their roles as mothers and sisters are reflections of the very essence of the Family. In 
point, for a state to initiate a successful counterinsurgency campaign it must recognize the 
fundamentally essential role women play within the organization and “the family 
dimension cannot be ignored.”143 Such considerations will lead to positive relations with 
the family unit thereby gaining ground with the local village or tribal units and eventually 
widespread national success. Counterinsurgency policies should reflect the particulars of 
each component organization and its populations, both male and female. Furthermore, 
“one thing is certain: the female role is powerful, integrated, and organized, closely 
connected to the typology and characteristics of the organization in which she 
operates.”144 For many women who turn to the state for help or operate with 
counterinsurgent forces, they can inevitably experience shunning, threats, or retaliation. 
The state and society must address this for any future attempts at counterinsurgency 
policies. Nor will a catch-all approach to the insurgency suffice. The variations across the 
spectrum from the Taliban to Hezb-i-Islami, not to mention those within the 
organizations themselves’ factions must be taken into consideration given their unique 
organizational structures and the varying levels and degrees of female support systems. 
Certainly though it is imperative in all cases for the state and its judicial polities to 
address the female community of these organizations in order to truly gain ground against 
this insurgent element. The Female Engagement Teams represent the most viable means 
by which to do so and are vital to continued COIN efforts. 
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V. GETTING AN IN WITH THE WOMEN 
Engagement is the key to disseminating commander’s messages, 
information collection (passive and active), influencing the population, 
understanding tribal dynamics, collecting atmospherics, 
deescalating/softening the public’s perception of offensive operations, and 
understanding the needs of the population.145 
 
A. CULTURAL REALITY 
It is imperative in order to truly engage the population of Afghanistan to 
recognize the unique tribal culture of the region and its impediments on top-down change 
and population engagement, particularly those which are pertinent to the female 
populace. Tribal or local cultural norms as well as religious determinations and 
interpretations can often supersede all other pulls on the individual including sense of 
self, the nuclear or extended family, or state allegiance. At times they can even contradict 
established global religious edicts or at the very least become amalgamated to an 
uneducated populous. Culture is the established and utterly complex whole which 
identifies a society and its members, comprised of knowledge, beliefs, morals, laws and 
customs. Particularly pertinent in Afghanistan is the notion that “in the realm of the 
power of ideas, the two most significant are conceptions of group identity... and the 
cultural framework of Islam.”146 Kinship or group identity is the utmost imperative 
superseding any personal interests in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, many “Afghans claim 
that international forces lack respect for culture and traditions.”147 Interactions between 
male International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operatives and native Afghans 
substantiate this claim, particularly those involving Afghan women. 
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1.  Tribalism 
Tribal identity is perhaps the most pervasive component of any Afghan identity. 
Forces seeking to counter such loyalties can find it difficult to penetrate these deeply 
entrenched and tight familial structures in order to negotiate or influence them. Tribal 
cultures identify based upon familial ties and commitments. In order to supersede these 
loyalties, states must truly understand them, engage the population, and operate within 
the given constructs. 
a. Pashtunwali 
 Perhaps the most pervasive and demonstrative example of such cultural 
constraints in Afghanistan is that of Pashtunwali. Pashtunwali is the code by which the 
major ethnic group of Afghanistan, the Pashtuns, adheres. Since the dominant component 
of the Taliban insurgency is comprised of Pashtuns, their social code and order is of 
particular importance when pursuing a population engagement strategy for International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) units in Afghanistan. “Afghans, and especially 
Pashtuns, have historically been fiercely independent and highly xenophobic” and as 
such, any population engagement strategy must reflect this aspect of Afghan culture.  148 
Within Afghanistan, ethnic groups abound. All are predominantly defined 
as tribal. The tribes themselves represent a formation of ethnicity derived from lineage 
relating to a common ancestor, traditionally patrilineal and “the Pashtuns are the best 
example of this, with their ability to link scores of lineages comprising millions of people 
into a single genealogy backward through time to their founding ancestor.”149 Since the 
mid-eighteenth century, Pashtuns, tracing their origin to Qais, have represented the 
largest and most dominant ethnic group in the area; comprising approximately 40 percent 
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of the total population.150  They are an “acephalous, egalitarian, kinship-organized 
society, segmented into tribes successively subdividing into clan, section, subsection, and 
family.”151 On the other hand, more importantly than lineage, Pashtuns are inherently 
defined by their adherence and complicity to Pashtunwali.  
Pashtunwali (the way of the Pashtuns) is a set of codes and norms that are 
founded upon the principles of honor (izzat) and chivalry (nang). Within the many tenets 
of Pashtunwali are the three which determine honor; gold (zar), women (zan), and land 
(zamin). Of these, women are the personification of such honor and their personal honor 
holds strong reflection over the honor of the tribe as a whole. Namus are the requirements 
to maintain this honor of the Pashtun society’s women and are thus an essential 
component for the division of the genders (purdah).152 A woman’s honor is determined 
by her and her kin’s adherence to cultural norms (as in Pashtunwali) and prevailing 
Islamic interpretations of modesty and purdah.  
B. DIVISION OF GENDERS 
1. Feminine Modesty 
A web of political and cultural pressures and symbolism surround the concept of 
seclusion.153 Unfortunately, this is likely to remain the case until global society can 
differentiate the custom of gender division and its many fabrications as a cultural 
phenomenon and not a representation solely of Islam or of Afghanistan. Until entities on 
both sides cease to use Islamic and cultural interpretations of female modesty as 
justification for and opposition against female oppression, female honor will continue to 
remain a political debate hot issue rather than the individual religious and cultural choice 
it is at its true core. Likely this will remain the case until Western media and popular 
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culture begin to recognize the variations of Islam and culture and cease to reflect and 
promote an insidiously hostile view of Afghan culture where women who are secluded 
and veiled are inherently oppressed thereby by negating conservative and Taliban 
ammunition and support. Only by understanding the cultural and religious dictates of 
Afghan culture and society, can American and international forces fully penetrate and 
engage the population in order to promote its agenda. Female interactions with such 
forces represent the greatest potential for both success and failure. 
Presently, many Western observers associate purdah and the wearing of a veil or 
some form of head covering by Muslim women as a reflection of a backward 
conservative patriarchal interpretation of Islam and “in the West harem, veil, polygamy 
envoke Islam and are synonymous with female weakness and oppression.”154 In fact, it 
has at times become the quintessential representation of Islam, exceeding at times even 
the Crescent to observers. Too often the defining images of Afghan society are women 
hidden away in homes or blue burqus. Whenever many Westerners see a woman in a 
head covering (particularly those that do more than simply cover the hair) or harshly and 
blatantly separated from their male counterparts, racial, religious and ethnic stereotypes 
abound and can be detrimental to a population engagement strategy. Women all over the 
globe regardless of religion, culture, or ethnicity have demonstrated some variation on the 
veil and feminine modesty, particularly those that abound within the Middle East and 
Eastern Mediterranean areas. This phenomenon is by no means strictly an Islamic 
construct or practice. In fact it far outdates the evolution of Islam and its monotheist 
counterparts though they are certainly the most attributed for its evolution and 
proliferation.  
The reasons for the division of genders and outwardly demonstrated feminine 
modesty extend beyond the simplicities of religious edicts towards cultural norms. 
Motivations are diverse and varied. Too often feminist arguments claim that secluded 
women are simply at the mercy of their patriarchal societies and have little say in their 
destiny let alone their attire. Yet such arguments fail to reflect the vast variety of 
                                               
154 Fadwa El Guindi. “Veiling in Perspective” in Veil: Modesty, Privacy and Resistance. Oxford: 
Berg Publishers, 1999, 10. 
 55 
motivations women have for veiling. Unfortunately, Western feminists oftentimes 
“misunderstand the use of the veil and devalue local cultures by insisting that their own 
road to emancipation is the only one.”155 Nor does the “single convenient Western term 
veil, which is indiscriminate, monolithic, and ambiguous”156 aptly describe the vast array 
of methods by which the genders are segregated. 
2. Historical Context 
The concept of modesty is by no means an Islamic construct. It in fact predates 
Islam and reflects both other monotheist religions as well as pre-Islamic cultures 
occupying the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East prior to Muhammad. Feminine 
modesty is oft “presented as having originated millennia ago and spread across the 
Persian, Mesopotamian, Hellenic, and Byzantine civilizations, from Achaemenid rule, to 
Greek, Parthian, and Sassanian in successive invasions, presumably having been 
borrowed between ruling dynasties throughout the region, eventually to become ordinary 
social practices.”157 Ancient Mesopotamian cultures demonstrated an increasing level of 
restrictions placed upon women including seclusion and standards of attire. At this time a 
woman’s veil was used to distinguish between classes and those veiled were regarded as 
protected and associated with the wealthy elites.158 Well into the Byzantine era, societies 
would utilize varying interpretations of the seclusion of women, be it cloistering or 
veiling and “barring some general disaster women were always supposed to be veiled, the 
veil or its absence marking the distinction between the honest woman and the 
prostitute.”159 Separation of the sexes, and emphasis on female modesty and the minimal 
freedoms of women extended to pre-Christian Greek Hellenistic societies as well. These 
interpretations were regionally and culturally specific and crossed all swaths of religions 
particularly the misogynistic monotheist Zoroastrian, Judaic, and Christian ones which 
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often denounced women on the basis of Original Sin. Medieval Jewish Egyptians in the 
eleventh century also likely supported and practiced some version of veiling.160 During 
the Roman Christian heyday, the “shamefulness of sex was focused most intensely on the 
shamefulness of the female body, which had to be totally concealed.”161 Women and 
particularly the female form across all religions and cultures of the region were seen as 
the embodiment of the temptation of man and as such were required to be covered in 
order to demonstrate modesty and ensure respect and decorum within the entirety of 
society.162  
As evidenced, “Islam did not introduce veiling.”163 Within this framework of the 
Middle East, Islam would emerge in Afghanistan. In keeping with the Judeo-Christian 
framework, Muhammad would bring the structures of Islam and its resounding effects 
upon female life into the region. Following his emigration to Madina and his marriage to 
Zeinab bint Jahsh, Muhammad began to limit the exposure and movements of his wives. 
As veiling was already commonly practiced amongst the upper classes, Muhammad did 
not introduce this concept. At the time, only Muhammad’s wives would be required to 
take the veil and subsequently the phrase “she took the veil” would come to signify that a 
woman had married Muhammad himself.164 At his passing, the tradition of the veil was 
not considered a common or prescribed adherence of the faith. Likely its growth and 
spread resulted from the exalted status of his wives and its previously established 
reflections on feminine respectability and status.  Yet certainly the practice of veiling and 
seclusion, or some version similar in form or function, existed in all of these historic 
cultures and religions of the region long before the rise of Islam.165 
At the onset of major European colonialism in Afghanistan, the status of women 
in Europe was in a constant state of debate and flux. Women’s suffrage and feminist 
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movements were on the upswing. Yet despite their diminished status at home, Europeans 
saw veiled Islamic women as the very epitome of patriarchy and backwardness. It was 
the imperative of any enlightened society to unveil its women and many would do so 
forcibly in keeping with European standards and expectations. In 1899 Qassim Amin 
published works calling for changes in the customs of women and their costumes, in 
particular the abolishment of the veil as integral to achieving the necessary social change 
for development of the Middle East. Naturally this beginning of the colonial Arab and 
South Asian feminist movement was met with anger, resentment and resistance 
throughout the region.166 By the nineteenth century and the height of European 
colonialism, purdah would become the center of discourse and narrative on progress and 
modernity within Islam and the region and “the custom of veiling and the position of 
women in Muslim societies became, in their rhetoric, the proof of the inferiority of Islam 
and the justification of their efforts to undermine Muslim religion and society.”167  
It is within this framework that modern discourses and discussions on female 
status have emerged in Afghanistan. To date, the female seclusion and religious garb are 
often seen as a reflection of the otherness and therefore backwardness of Afghan cultures. 
Many espouse the ideals that only with the removal of such religious and cultural norms 
can a culture elevate the status of women beyond oppression.168 Arguments often fail to 
address the more likely reasoning for the oppression of women in Afghan society; 
patriarchal and societal interpretations and political manipulations. Radical conservatives, 
as evidenced by the Taliban’s proselytizing and religious edicts, often capitalize on these 
attacks by using the oppression of women and the veil along with extreme interpretations 
of Islam as a statement for anti-colonialism and cultural norms.  
The history, and the struggles over culture and between classes, continues 
to live even today in the debates on the veil and on women. To a 
considerable extent, overtly or covertly, inadvertently or otherwise, 
discussions of women in Islam in academies and outside them, and in 
Muslim countries and outside them, continue either to reinscribe the 
                                               
166 Ahmed, 145. 
167 Ibid, 237. 
168 Ibid, 165. 
 58 
Western narrative of Islam as oppressor and the West as liberator...or 
conversely, to reinscribe the contentions of the Arabic narrative of 
resistance as to the essentialness of preserving Muslim customs, 
particularly with regard to women, as a sign of resistance to imperialism, 
whether colonial or postcolonial.169  
This narrative has fueled the religious and culturally dominated rhetoric of the 
insurgency in Afghanistan.  
3. Islamic Directives 
Regardless of its origins; be they philosophical, social, moral, economic, or 
psychological; the concept of seclusion certainly exists within Islamic text and as such 
must be considered within any population engagement strategy.170 There are two 
predominant mentions of modesty and veiling within the Quran. Firstly, in the Surah 33 
(Al- Ahzab regarding The Clans, The Coalition, The Combined Forces), verse 59 and 
again in Surah 24 (Al-Noor regarding The Light) verse 31.171  The former states “O 
Prophet, tell your wives, your daughters, and the wives of the faithful to cover themselves 
with their great veils, a sure way that they be recognized and that they avoid any 
offense.”172 The latter deals with the rules of conduct and cites as follows. 
Say to the believing women to lower their gaze and to guard their 
modesty, not to show their beauty, except for what is apparent, and to 
draw their veil over their bosoms. They should not display their beauty 
except to their husbands, their fathers, their husband’s fathers, their sons, 
their sisters’ sons, or their women, or the female slaves whom their right 
hand possess, or to their males slaves incapable of the sexual act, or to 
boys who are as yet ignorant of intimacy with women. And they should 
not stamp their feet on the ground, so as not to reveal their hidden 
ornaments... 173 
                                               
169 Ibid, 167. 
170 Lamia Rustum Shehadeh. The Idea of Women in Fundamentalist Islam. (Gainesville: University 
Press of Florida, 2003), 108. 
171 See www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/quran/. 
172 Delcambre, 31. 
173 Ibid, 31. 
 59 
Unlike its Judeo-Christian predecessors, Islam is considered the direct revelation 
from God to Muhammad via Gabriel. Subsequently, it must first and foremost be taken in 
its exact text.174 This dogmatic mandate for literal translation makes the issue of the 
division of the genders a hotbed one since despite its mention there is no exact definition 
of the veil, seclusion or feminine modesty within the Quran itself. Such ambiguities leave 
the subjects open to vast cultural interpretation and therefore debate and 
misunderstanding. 
Thus, without a clear text regarding the subject, tradition and custom have played 
an integral role in the custom of veiling and female seclusion in Afghanistan and arguers 
for seclusion “cite Prophetic traditions (hadith) from which many of the legal stipulations 
and practices are derived.”175 Within the Sunni traditions (the predominant faith of 
Afghanistan), veiling and modesty is mentioned in the Sunna or religious customs of 
Muhammad during an interaction between Muhammad and his wife Aisha’s sister Asma, 
where he turns away from her exclaiming that she is too thinly dressed and that one 
should not be able to see anything of a woman’s body besides her face and hands.176 This 
has become the cornerstone of the major interpretations and is the most vastly utilized 
variation of garb globally. Still throughout Islam one can see a wide variety of 
applications of seclusion. Overtime the various schools of Islamic Sharia Law would 
evolve often heavily influenced by the local customs and particularly inculcated with this 
scope for the perspectives on the provisions regarding women; hence the more extreme 
burqu and segregation practices found in Afghan society.177 Still, the Quran dictates 
specifically that men and women shall be granted equal status in society.  
4. Why Separate? 
The directives for modesty and veiling do plainly exist, however still much is left 
to cultural interpretation. At its core the basic meaning abounds, that of the separation of 
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the sexes and the reflection of female wholesomeness, propriety, and modesty. “The 
Quran advocates modesty and moral decorum and cautions against provocative behavior, 
especially in the context of interaction and encounter between the opposite sexes... This is 
the basic message but the text does not specify exactly how modesty is achieved.”178 
Subsequently, the word veil does little to reflect the vast swath of terms used to refer to 
the articles of attire and seclusion fails to address the many methods of dividing the 
genders used to meet these standards; which often vary by region, dialect and era. “Some 
half a billion women in the world are Muslim”179 and their culturally influenced 
interpretations on the Quranic dictates for the division of the genders are just as 
numerous. “It perhaps goes without saying that Afghanistan is a Muslim country, mostly 
Sunni (85 percent) with a minority (15 percent) of Shias and Ismailis”180 and as such, the 
veil and female seclusion are prominent components of Afghan society. When the 
Taliban came to power, they played upon the existing conservative interpretations and 
practices of gender seclusion and segregation. Nevertheless, by no means did they 
generate and enforce a completely alien way of life to the average Afghan. 
The original intent of purdah in Afghanistan has traditionally been the protection, 
honor, and distinction of women.181 Traditional interpretations of the desire to segregate 
were as follows. Advocates of both genders reflected these trends. 
The philosophical trend describes it as a form of spiritual and religious 
exercise; the social stream sees it as a form of protection of women against 
insecurity and social injustice; the economic current attributes it to 
patriarchy and its concomitant subordination and exploitation of women’s 
economic potential; the moralists trace it to man’s egocentricity and 
jealousy; and, finally, the psychological school ascribes it to women’s 
monthly menstruation, during which they feel inferior and discarded.182  
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Whether or not Afghan women may choose to ascribe to a particular rationale or 
whether it is forced upon her by society is varied throughout the state and its history. 
Tradition and compulsion certainly exist in some regions where local culture is staunchly 
conservative. Certainly, though, not all Afghan women are forced to comply against their 
will.183 Unfortunately, the negative highly visible cases tend to supersede alternatives and 
are used as ammunition and fodder to equate the concept of purdah with female 
oppression and by association, Islam with patriarchy. Culturally relativistic approaches to 
female modesty and the division of genders, recognizing them as a cultural norm rather 
than an oppressive edict, are growing albeit slowly. Furthermore, recognition is growing 
that “the segregation of genders does not necessarily result in the total disempowerment 
of women” and as such any astute counterinsurgency and population engagement strategy 
must address this cornerstone of society.184 
The veil or separation of the genders is a long-standing cultural and religious 
tradition within Afghanistan. While the convention is certainly not an Islamic construct, 
Afghan interpretations of Islam seem to have adopted, codified and institutionalized it to 
the greatest extent. Subsequently, it has become a prominent reflection to other religious 
and cultural traditions of Afghan women and is often perceived to represent what is felt 
to be the worst attributes of Afghan society, patriarchy and the subjugation of women; 
regardless of whether this accurately reflects the custom or its practitioners.  
C. POPULATION ENGAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN 
1. Female Engagement Teams 
Keeping in mind the aforementioned strong cultural and religious realities facing 
ISAF forces in Afghanistan, allied forces have sought out various measures to reach the 
women of this society.  Such strategies as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Human 
Terrain Teams, and Female Engagement Teams are aimed at reaching the maximum 
population capacity to garner support both for the international forces as well as the 
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Afghan regime by providing basic quality of life necessities, establishing security at the 
lower levels of government, and enhancing a more positive perception of American 
presence and influence. “It takes a whole-of-society approach to transform harmful 
attitudes and behaviors in a lasting way”185 and by operating within the given constraints 
rather than against them, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Human Terrain Teams 
have been met with certain successes in engaging the local community and providing 
greatly needed developmental and aid capacities. Despite this, in order to truly engage the 
female populace, the Female Engagement Teams evolved to reflect the particular nature 
of the realities regarding cultural and religious constraints on female interactions.  
As a representation of evolving American population engagement efforts, the 
Female Engagement Teams in Afghanistan have sought to bring about significant 
population engagement both with women but also with men. Often viewed as a 
nonthreatening third gender, engagement team members have been extended courtesy 
and respect from both genders and granted, previously unattainable by male service 
members, levels of access to each.186 While there may be strong cultural sensitivities 
regarding gender relations, female service members have oft been able to bridge the gap. 
They are often seen as more amenable, welcoming, and accommodating persons. Many 
team members have often heard the Afghan adage that “your men come here to fight, but 
we know the women are here to help.”187 This has enabled an unforeseen benefit to these 
teams allowing them to engage the male population in more ways than their male 
counterparts.188 Surveyed responses indicated that this was also a reflection of the more 
population engagement specific training afforded female operatives who unlike their 
infantry counterparts were trained in this area of expertise rather than first and foremost 
as combat operators and secondarily, as hindsight dictated, as population engagers.  
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2. Analysis 
Perhaps the greatest challenge facing international forces in Afghanistan is that 
regardless of their true intent, Afghan history dictates that they will always be seen as an 
occupier. Their mere presence can detract from any perceived legitimacy. It is a “battle 
for perceptions.”189 This perception is difficult to counter and only with successful 
population engagement can it be done. The goal is always to gain legitimacy by winning 
over the hearts and minds of the local populace.190 Then again, in order to truly engage 
the Afghan population, cultural and religious understanding must take precedence in all 
facets of interaction. The Female Engagement Teams represent a unique opportunity to 
do just that without appearing as an occupier sent to force its culture upon Afghan 
society. “It takes a certain amount of savvy to wield the culture as a weapon...”191 though 
this is not to say that one can change the cultural situation but rather there exists a 
potential to exploit these norms to the advantage of ISAF forces. 
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VI. FINAL THOUGHTS 
A. ANALYSIS 
It is imperative when discussing the Female Engagement Teams (FET) to keep in 
mind that every Marine is a rifleman, regardless of gender. Female Marines are by no 
means diplomats solely because of their gender any more than their male compatriots. 
Subsequently, any utilization of them within these teams requires the continuation of a 
vigilant and highly selective assignment system where members are determined based 
upon cultural, military, and psychological capabilities and training rather than ad hoc 
requirements.  
It is equally of import to integrate a highly specified, well-known and defined 
FET mission within the auspices of the counterinsurgency and population 
engagement/information operations missions in order to best capitalize on their potential 
contributions. Along with the individual team members, leadership must be educated as 
to the teams overall mission and protocol for application. Leadership must recognize the 
uniqueness of particular regions and communities of Afghanistan and apply the teams in 
an advantageous manner reflective of the given environment. Lessons learned need to be 
pervasive, well documented and supplied to all team members and leadership thereof. 
B. THE GAPS 
Due to their relative newness as a concept and ad hoc nature in an already 
ongoing war, little analysis has been conducted regarding the efficacy and operational 
capabilities of such teams. These gaps extend to both the qualitative and quantitative 
realms. After action reports regarding many of the teams often still remain on the Secret 
classification given the ongoing nature of the conflict. Once such time as said information 
is more readily available to academic and military scrutiny, more analytical 
determinations can be made regarding their true operational effectiveness. Surveyed 
members and leaders felt that there needed to be significantly greater detailed analysis of 
 66 
the teams’ usage and efficiency in given operations so that a more specific mission and 
tactical applications set could be identified.  
C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
1.  COIN and Population Engagement 
With regards to current counterinsurgency and population engagement strategies, 
such strategies require precise determinations as to the tactical efficacy and usage of 
Female Engagement Teams. Their contributions to such strategies need to reflect both the 
needs of the policies and the tactical capacities of the units given the cultural and 
religious constraints as well as the restrictions of current combat exclusion policies. Once 
the gaps in both quantitative and qualitative data pertaining to their efficacy and 
contributions to such strategies is minimized than such determinations can be made. Until 
such time, any policy determinations regarding the teams are simply ad hoc guesstimates.  
2.  Combat Exclusion 
For combat exclusion, the Female Engagement Teams have continued to highlight 
the disparities of such policies. The lack of a formal battlefield and the very nature of the 
ongoing conflict make application of regulations difficult and often to the detriment of 
the mission at hand. Long gone are the days of trench warfare.  
a.  Possible Policies 
Several possible alternatives the DoD could initiate in order to resolve the 
current defunct policy directives. (Pro’s and con’s) 
(1)  Leave It As Is.  Leadership has been forced to find ways to 
circumvent the spirit while still maintaining the letter of the law. Such inadvertent 
charades are by no means a proper way to conduct a military.  
(2)  Continue Current Trend of Change. Iterations of combat 




opportunities and positions for women. Women’s successes in the fields of ship driving, 
aviation, and combat support positions have continued to press leadership to offer further 
opportunities for advancement. 
(3)  Abolish Exclusion Entirely. While the realities of warfare 
are by no means restricted to the male gender, such hasty abolishment would be 
exceedingly difficult for the American military to enact quickly. Such action would fail to 
allocate proper time for training and transition. Certainly new assignment policies 
regarding physical requirements for certain positions would need time to be established 
as well as regulations regarding hygiene, pregnancy, and other female specific issues. 
These considerations require time for analysis, determination, and application. 
(4)  Remove Women From the Equation. Given the nature of 
the American All Volunteer Force, it would be nigh on impossible to refill all the various 
support and active positions which female soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines hold in 
this day and age.  In fact, women now wield more than half of the technical degrees 
required for competitive positions and eliminating half the competition pool would be a 
detriment to the services. 
b.  Recommendation 
Recent amendments in the policy reflect today’s actualities and are sure to 
continue to reflect the realities on the ground regarding the assignment of women and 
their relation to combat and as such the current trend of change is likely the best option. 
The recent addition of women to certain submarine units and the opening of greater 
numbers of intelligence and logistics positions reflect a shifting towards the 
diminishment of combat exclusion. This should continue but with great understanding of 
the time needed for adequate training, analysis, and application before policy 
determinations are made.  
3.  Gender Relations 
With regards to the assignment of operators and gender relations in Afghanistan 
and other such environments, tactical efficiency and improvement of relationships with 
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host nation personnel is the objective.  Success from the Female Engagement Teams in 
Afghanistan with population engagement and counterinsurgency have served as an 
impetus to establish more formalized protocol for engagement between all genders of 
ISAF forces, ASF (Afghan Security Forces) personnel, and civilians as well as future 
iterations of such interactions.  As the DoD continues to rely on partnerships and 
coalitions for military operations within the country and greater Middle East and South 
Asian region, a standing policy for gender specific interaction is essential to establish a 
foundation for behavior appropriate for all levels of interaction as well as minimize the 
effects of logistical consequences due to lack of proper foresight wasting precious 
resources.  The policy should be crafted in a way to minimize the internal bureaucratic 
process to maximize efficacy of the policy. 
Currently no DoD or ISAF policy exists with regards to gender relations in the 
working environment between said forces and Afghan women.  Current established 
protocol is varied and dependent on command experience and knowledge of the region. 
This has the potential to lead to significant cultural conflicts. There have been numerous 
instances where cultural differences have interfered with operational capabilities to both 
the detriment of mission and personnel.  To date, no command policy regarding female-
male interactions is initiated until after an incident has occurred.  Once this happens, the 
unit commander establishes a protocol for their command term to avoid further 
altercations.  Lessons learned are often lost due to the high rate of Commanding Officer 
turnover in smaller units and the same lessons are learned repetitively due to lack of 
formalized policy.  
a.  Possible Policies 
Several possible alternatives the DoD could initiate in order to resolve the 
current lack of policy directive. (Pro’s and con’s) 
(1)  Do Nothing. Retention of the status quo and continuance of 
permitting unit commanders to establish protocol in response to previous situations fails 
to reflect the aforementioned issues.  These concerns have serious potential detriments to 
command operability, personnel safety, and foreign relations.  Only a few of the many 
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current DoD policies and instructions make a distinction between the genders in order to 
maximize operational readiness albeit this is usually a reflection of combat exclusion and 
assignment policies.  
(2)  Slight Formalization. Amending the current protocol by 
formalizing it slightly would establish DoD policy instructing unit level commanders to 
address any potential conflicts, given their particular missions and level of interactions 
with Afghans.  
(3)  Detailed Formalization. The establishment of a specified 
and formalized policy for regional commander’s to address each and every potential 
interaction within their area of responsibility would likely represent a serious overreach 
in policy. It would be nigh impossible for one instruction to cover every potential 
interaction by every DoD actor in their given regional command.  Such an instruction 
would tie the hands of any unit level commander to react to new and ever evolving 
relations with Afghan society. 
(4)  Extensive Training. The option of requiring extensive 
cultural training for all personnel operating in the region would certainly aim to mitigate 
negative cases. Unfortunately, this would limit the flexibility of deployable units and 
personnel and hinder operational capabilities.  Some form of cultural training for DoD 
personnel permanently deployed in a given region would be viable. On the other hand, 
for short term or rapid deployments this would be difficult and a hindrance.  Prior to 
deployments, informal training is usually presented to the unit and/or command on the 
culture, society, and geopolitical status.  Conversely, such training does not tailor to 
gender interactions but rather focuses on cultural issues during operational engagements. 
(5)  Restrict Interactions. Any resolution of potential conflicts 
by simply no longer deploying females to Afghan facilities or potential operating units, or 
conversely prohibiting male operators from interacting with female Afghans, fails to 
reflect that every military unit has the potential to deploy at any given time. This form of 
resolution is simply unobtainable and unrealistic.    
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(6)  Penalization. The enactment of severe penalties for 
misdeeds regarding DoD male interactions with host nation females and civilians would 
be difficult to enforce over the given dictates of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice. 
b.  Recommendation 
The most viable recommendation is that of a slight formalization to 
establish a DoD policy directed towards unit level Commanding Officers instructing 
commanders during their associated commanding officer training to address any potential 
conflicts or situations given their particular unit.  This policy would ensure any lessons 
learned from previous Commanding Officers are passed down to oncoming commanders.  
It would enable better foresight by senior officers to address these potential issues rather 
than forcing the boots on the ground to make decisions, which could reflect on the DoD 
and ISAF poorly.  This increased preparedness would enhance operational capabilities 
whilst still being cognizant of cultural sensitivities.  This policy could result in varying 
protocols established by different commanders, and would significantly allow for 
variance in particular units and regions and their levels of interaction.  
D.  CONCLUSION 
The cultural and religious minefield of Afghanistan is by no means impermeable. 
Proper counterinsurgency and population engagement reflective of these issues offer the 
best means to penetrate the society for both intelligence gathering and information 
dissemination. The Female Engagement Teams highlight this coordination of both 
respect for cultural norms and adequate military operations. Understanding of both the 
tribal networks wielded by women and their capacities to influence their world while still 
recognizing the given constraints and realities of gender seclusion are a necessity to truly 
exploit the human and cultural terrain in Afghanistan. The FETs despite the restrictions 
of combat exclusion seem the preeminent means by which to tap into this fountain of 
possibility. 
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APPENDIX.  SURVEY QUESTIONS 
A.  DEMOGRAPHICS (DATA NOT FOR ANALYSIS, STRICTLY TO 
ENSURE A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE) 
1. What is your gender : M/F 




 Air Force 
 Army 
 
B. MISSION AWARENESS/ASSESSMENT 
3. To your knowledge what was the mission of the Female Engagement Teams in 
Afghanistan? 
4. How did the teams seek to execute this mission?  
5. Based upon the given mission accomplishment criteria, were they successful? : 
Y/N 
6. Why/Why Not? 
7. What were the Afghan responses to the teams? 




C.  POLICY AWARENESS/ASSESSMENT 
9. To your knowledge what are the American counter-insurgency objectives? 
10. To your knowledge what are the objectives of population engagement strategies? 
11. Are gender normative tactics (gender specific efforts) in keeping with these 
objectives? : Y/N 
12. Why/Why Not? 
13. Do the FETs, as a gender normative tactic, serve these objectives? : Y/N 
14. Why/Why Not? 
15. Do current FET directives enable the accomplishment of these greater strategy 
objectives?: Y/N 
16. Why/Why Not? 
17. What examples can you give of instances where the FETs served a vital 
component of either counter-insurgency or population engagement? 
18. What examples can you give of instances where the FETs were counterproductive 
to either counter-insurgency or population engagement? 
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19. To what extent are you knowledgeable of the combat exclusion laws for U.S. 
female military personnel? 
 Very good understanding 
 Good understanding 
 Vague understanding 
 No knowledge of current restrictions 
20.  Given the definition (cite Title 10 U.S.C.) and based on your 
experience/knowledge, are the FETs in violation of this policy? 
21. Why/Why Not? 
22. Do you have any additional information which you feel would be beneficial to a 
greater academic understanding of the Female Engagement Teams and their 
efforts in Afghanistan? 
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